



RETHINKING THE CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
Brian G. Slocum* 
The canon of constitutional avoidance is controversial in part because it sanctions 
statutory interpretations that courts might otherwise view as impermissibly activist, 
which makes the features of its definition of crucial importance.  Critics have rightly 
condemned the Court’s conception of the avoidance canon, but these criticisms have 
largely failed to identify the canon’s flaws.  For instance, the Supreme Court characterizes 
the avoidance canon as a mere tie-breaking principle that applies only after it identifies 
linguistic “ambiguity,” but critics maintain that the Court frequently uses the canon as 
justification to “rewrite laws.”  The “rewriting” argument is overstated.  In fact, the Court’s 
conception of ambiguity in avoidance canon cases is too narrow.  Primarily, this is because 
the Court has failed to recognize the different ways in which a statute might be 
indeterminate.  For instance, the Court has mistakenly maintained that implied 
limitations on statutory language involve “notably generous” interpretation.  To the 
contrary, implied meanings are a normal aspect of the meaning communicated by a text, 
and judicial recognition of an implied term does not necessarily involve the “rewriting” of 
laws.  Furthermore, the Court’s conception of the avoidance canon fails in other respects, 
also not often discussed by critics.  Most significantly, while the Court insists that textual 
ambiguity is a condition precedent to the application of the avoidance canon, the Court’s 
determination of ambiguity is largely subjective and based on jurisprudential 
commitments rather than neutral linguistic principles. 
This Article presents a novel, interdisciplinary analysis of how the Court should 
reconceptualize the avoidance canon based on a more nuanced understanding of 
language and the function of interpretive principles.  Part of the reconceptualization 
involves modifying the avoidance canon’s ambiguity trigger to allow for a more expansive 
understanding of the multiple ways in which a text can be indeterminate.  Instead of the 
Court’s current narrow focus on the literal meaning of textual language, the avoidance 
canon should be based on a broader notion of indeterminacy viewed in light of the 
“communicative meaning” of a text.  The avoidance canon is typically justified by 
normative principles regarding judicial restraint rather than as an aspect of the 
communicative meaning of a text.  Like other substantive canons, though, it is also based 
on a presupposition about the clarity of congressional statutory drafting that is tied to 
communicative meaning.  When framed in such a manner, the avoidance canon can serve 
as a useful tool for resolving statutory indeterminacy, particularly in cases where implied 
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language is necessary to make a statute determinate enough to resolve the interpretive 
dispute.  The purpose of this new understanding of the avoidance canon is not to create 
more situations where the canon is applied in order to select second-best interpretations.  
Rather, by reconsidering the foundation of the avoidance canon, the Court can make the 
canon more coherent as well as consistent with other important interpretive canons and 
principles governing language usage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The canon of constitutional avoidance implicates some of the most 
fundamental aspects of the judicial function in matters of 
interpretation.1  Along with avoiding the need for judicial invalidation of 
a statute on constitutional grounds, the avoidance canon enables courts 
to select interpretations that might otherwise be difficult to justify.2  Not 
surprisingly, the canon has attracted significant attention and criticism.  
Critics argue that the canon allows courts to engage in sloppy 
constitutional reasoning and adopt statutory interpretations that ignore 
the clear terms of a provision.3  Indeed, the canon has been deemed a 
 
 1 See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997) (referring to the 
avoidance canon as “perhaps the preeminent canon of federal statutory construction”). 
 2 See Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1275, 1275 (2016) (arguing that the Court has used the avoidance canon to “rewrite laws”). 
 3 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme 
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2122 (2015) (“The avoidance canon 
enables—even demands—sloppy and cursory constitutional reasoning.”); Philip P. Frickey, 
Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and 
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 400 
(2005) (indicating that a “fundamental attack” on the avoidance canon is that it “allows a 
court . . . to rewrite statutes without clear limits on the revising role”); William K. Kelley, 
Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 831–
32 (2001) (calling for the abandonment of the avoidance canon in part because it “frequently 
results in questionable statutory interpretations”); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 94–95 (1995) (arguing that the avoidance canon promotes judicial 
activism).  Although most scholarship has been critical of the avoidance canon, empirical 
evidence indicates that the activism critiques may be overstated.  See also Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 830–31 (2017) 
(showing that the Court has often “used the avoidance canon to read a statute in a manner 
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“tool of constitutional law” rather than a “maxim of statutory 
interpretation.”4  Yet, perhaps in a desire to avoid charges of activism, 
the Supreme Court insists that the avoidance canon is “settled policy”5 
and “beyond debate”6 and frames the canon as having a relatively 
modest effect on statutory interpretation.  The Court is careful to 
maintain that the avoidance canon “does not supplant traditional modes 
of statutory interpretation”7 and requires “ordinary textual analysis.”8  
Thus, according to the Court, the avoidance canon “is a tool for choosing 
between competing plausible interpretations”9 of a provision and “has 
no application in the absence of . . . ambiguity.”10  Nevertheless, despite 
the Court’s claims that the avoidance canon is a mere tie-breaking 
principle that resolves ambiguity, criticisms persist (including from 
Justices in dissenting opinions) that the canon allows courts to “rewrite 
laws” in order to avoid definitively deciding constitutional questions.11 
Critics have greatly overstated the extent to which the avoidance 
canon enables courts to “rewrite” legislation, but the Court’s application 
of the avoidance canon often does not match its description of it.  At 
times, the Court’s application of the avoidance canon matches its narrow 
conception of it, but the Court has often applied the canon in a much 
more aggressive manner.12  This inconsistency should compel the Court 
to modify the avoidance canon so that the canon’s conceptualization and 
application cohere in a persuasive manner.  This Article outlines a 
theory of how the Court should do so. 
The inconsistency between the Court’s conceptualization and 
application of the avoidance canon can be addressed through 
consideration of the two basic elements essential to the role of any 
principle of statutory interpretation.  One element (which I name the 
 
that honored a recent congressional override, or to preserve a long-standing statute against 
constitutional challenge.”). 
 4 Frickey, supra note 3, at 402. 
 5 Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989). 
 6 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988). 
 7 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008). 
 8 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005). 
 9 Id. at 381. 
 10 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001). 
 11 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Court had interpreted “a statute in obvious disregard of congressional intent” and 
“cur[ed] the resulting gap [in the statute] by writing a statutory amendment of its own”). 
 12 Part IV discusses examples of cases that critics and the current Court would characterize as 
involving aggressive application of the avoidance canon. 
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structural element) situates an interpretive principle within the 
commonly recognized judicial interpretive process and legitimizes the 
principle as an aspect of that process.  Thus, in accordance with how 
courts normally interpret statutes, some interpretive principles 
determine the meaning of textual language while others resolve 
“ambiguity” or provide a reason for deviating from a provision’s literal 
meaning.13  For instance, a grammatical rule about commas helps 
determine the linguistic meaning of a text,14 the rule of lenity resolves 
ambiguity in criminal statutes,15 and the absurdity doctrine provides a 
reason for deviating from a provision’s literal meaning.16  The other 
element (which I name the triggering element) concerns the 
circumstances that activate the interpretive principle.  Thus, a 
grammatical rule about commas is triggered by the presence (or 
absence) of a comma, the rule of lenity is triggered by a determination 
of ambiguity, and the absurdity doctrine is triggered when the literal 
meaning of a provision would result in an absurd outcome.17 
Scholars and courts have largely overlooked the interaction between 
the structural and triggering elements, as well as whether a given trigger 
 
 13 Some interpretive principles, such as legislative history, are used by some judges to 
determine the linguistic meaning of a provision and by other judges only to resolve 
ambiguity.  See Mark DeForrest, Taming a Dragon: Legislative History in Legal Analysis, 39 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 37, 41 (2013) (“There is a diversity of views regarding the use of legislative 
history, and not all judges and scholars are convinced it is necessary to find an ambiguity in 
statutory language before resorting to inspection of the legislative record.”). 
 14 See Lance Phillip Timbreza, The Elusive Comma: The Proper Role of Punctuation in Statutory 
Interpretation, 24 QLR 63, 67–68 (2005) (identifying five “Punctuation Doctrines” the 
Supreme Court has relied upon in statutory interpretation). 
 15 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (explaining that the “‘rule [of 
lenity]’ . . . only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget 
one. . . . The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress 
has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to 
wrongdoers.”). 
 16 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003) 
(describing how courts have long embraced the idea that “judges may deviate from even the 
clearest statutory text when a given application would otherwise produce ‘absurd’ results.”). 
 17 The term “literal meaning” is used throughout this Article and is meant to refer to the 
linguistic meaning of the relevant sentence that is conventional and context independent.  See 
C. J. L. Talmage, Literal Meaning, Conventional Meaning and First Meaning, 40 ERKENNTNIS 
213, 213 (1994) (advancing the proposition that there is a distinction between literal and 
conventional meaning).  Essentially, then, literal meaning is based on the conventional 
meaning of language, which is primarily tied to the semantic meanings of the words.  See also 
FRANÇOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 3 (2004) (establishing that literal meaning can be 
determined via rules of a language and independently of speaker intent).  See infra notes 
130–42 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between semantic and pragmatic 
meaning). 
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adequately furthers the objectives of the interpretive principle.  
Consider though how changing the structural element can require a 
court to change the triggering element.  Imagine that the Supreme Court 
decides that the proper judicial function does not allow courts to deviate 
from the clear linguistic meaning of a statute.18  If the absurdity doctrine 
is to remain a viable interpretive principle, the Court must then 
reconceptualize both its structural and triggering elements.19  Does the 
absurdity doctrine now help determine the linguistic meaning of textual 
language?  If so, how does it help determine linguistic meaning?  
Furthermore, what would be its trigger?  More plausibly, the Court 
would declare that the absurdity doctrine is a device for resolving 
ambiguity, making its trigger a determination of ambiguity (plus an 
absurd outcome that would result from one of the possible 
interpretations).  As a result, the additional triggering requirement of 
ambiguity might reduce the number of cases in which the absurdity 
doctrine is applied. 
Changing an interpretive principle’s trigger can therefore have 
practical consequences that include an impact on the frequency of the 
principle’s application.20  To illustrate, consider Justice Kagan’s 
argument in her dissent in Yates v. United States21 that the Court should 
not have applied two textual canons of interpretation, noscitur a sociis 
and ejusdem generis, because they “resolve ambiguity” rather than help 
determine the linguistic meaning of a provision.22  Textual canons 
typically represent generalizations about how language is normally 
used, which makes them relevant to the linguistic meaning of a 
provision, in contrast to the typically normative interpretive principles 
used to resolve ambiguity.23  Nevertheless, Justice Kagan, not wanting 
the canons to be applied in the particular case, argued that “ambiguity” 
 
 18 See Manning, supra note 16, at 2431–38 (arguing that the absurdity doctrine is in tension 
with the Constitution). 
 19 Courts frequently dispute the required trigger for an interpretive principle.  See, e.g., EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262–64 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority had inappropriately elevated the presumption against extraterritoriality from a 
device to resolve ambiguity to clear statement rule status). 
 20 Another consequence is that changing the trigger may create conflicts with other interpretive 
principles that have the same trigger.  Thus, changing an interpretive principle’s trigger to 
ambiguity creates potential conflicts with other interpretive principles that are also triggered 
by ambiguity. 
 21 574 U.S. 528 (2015). 
 22 Id. at 564 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 23 See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (explaining the role of textual canons). 
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should be an element of the trigger for the canons.24  Such a change to 
the triggering element can also require a reconceptualization of the 
structural element.  If, for example, the Court believes that ambiguity is 
not an appropriate trigger for a given interpretive principle (as this 
Article advocates it should decide with the avoidance canon), it must not 
only choose a new triggering principle but also explain how the 
modified interpretive principle fits within the structure of 
interpretation. 
This Article, through the first interdisciplinary, linguistic analysis of 
the avoidance canon, takes two novel positions.  First, the Court’s 
applications of the canon are not as activist as critics claim, but, second, 
the canon’s structural and triggering elements should be 
reconceptualized.25  In fact, the Court’s recent efforts to define the 
avoidance canon narrowly have created an interpretive principle that is 
both based on a faulty understanding of language and in tension with 
other important interpretive principles (such as clear statement 
rules).26  The most significant problem is that the trigger for the 
avoidance canon, which requires a finding of ambiguity, is not based on 
a neutral linguistic principle (as the discussion of ‘ambiguity’ below 
illustrates).  The solution is to modify the avoidance canon’s trigger to 
recognize a more nuanced and expansive understanding of the multiple 
ways in which a text can be indeterminate.27  In turn, while separation-
 
 24 Ambiguity would thus be an element of the trigger for noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis 
in addition to the textual context that would normally trigger them.  Traditionally, the 
ejusdem generis canon is triggered by a catch-all phrase that is much broader in scope than 
the terms in the list that precede it.  See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF STATUTES 234 (1975) (providing an example in which “oaks, elms, and other vegetation” 
presumably limits the meaning of “other vegetation” to trees).  A judicial finding of ambiguity 
is thus not necessary to trigger the canon, although the often broad scope of the judicial 
conception of ambiguity would allow a provision to be labeled as “ambiguous” whenever the 
canon is used (giving Justice Kagan a basis for her claim about the requirement of ambiguity).  
See infra notes 127–32 and accompanying text (describing the judiciary’s definition of 
ambiguity). 
 25 Even if there is activism associated with the avoidance canon, it must be considered in light 
of the alternative of constitutional invalidation where judges nevertheless “effectively 
rewrite an unconstitutional statute in any way that will render it constitutionally valid.”  Eric 
Fish, Judicial Amendment, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 563, 563 (2016). 
 26 See infra notes 155–60, 172–86, 249–65 and accompanying text (explaining why the Court’s 
distinction between the avoidance canon and clear statement rules is incoherent). 
 27 In addition to the requirement of ambiguity, one of the available interpretations must “raise 
serious constitutional problems.”  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001).  Much of the 
controversy surrounding the avoidance canon derives from the Court’s move from a 
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of-powers concerns may have motivated the creation of the avoidance 
canon,28 courts should consider it an aspect of the “communicative 
meaning” of a provision by virtue of a presupposition about the clarity 
of congressional drafting when serious constitutional issues are 
implicated.29  The avoidance canon’s presupposition can serve to 
legitimize the canon and help courts analyze how a statute’s 
indeterminacy should be resolved.  These recommended changes to the 
avoidance canon are thus intended to enhance its coherency and 
consistent application rather than increase the number of situations 
where a court selects a second-best statutory interpretation in order to 
avoid a serious constitutional question. 
Part I of this Article explains that a judicial determination of 
ambiguity is often used generally as a trigger for interpretive creativity, 
especially when the relevant statutory language is dangerously broad.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom about judicial activism and the 
avoidance canon though, the Court has framed ambiguity narrowly in 
several recent avoidance canon cases by focusing on the ambiguity of 
explicit textual language.  As a result, the Court views the recognition of 
implied meanings as instances of extraordinary or “notably generous” 
interpretation.30  In defining ambiguity narrowly, the Court has 
distinguished the avoidance canon from another category of substantive 
canons known as clear statement rules.31  In the Court’s view, while the 
avoidance canon’s function is to “choos[e] among plausible meanings of 
an ambiguous statute,” a clear statement rule “implies a special 
substantive limit on the application of an otherwise unambiguous 
 
requirement of actual unconstitutionality to one where the interpretation must only raise 
serious questions about constitutionality.  See Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional 
Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331, 331–32 (2015) 
(detailing the Court’s increasing tendency to avoid constitutional questions altogether 
(“modern avoidance”) rather than conclusive, unconstitutional interpretative outcomes 
(“classical avoidance”)).  As this Article focuses exclusively on the ambiguity aspect of the 
avoidance canon’s trigger, for ease of composition and explanation, reference will be made in 
the singular to the avoidance canon’s trigger, as though it consists only of the ambiguity 
prong. 
 28 See Kelley, supra note 3, at 833 (explaining that “[u]ntil relatively recently . . . commentators 
seemed not to focus much attention on the avoidance canon and whether it in fact advances 
its purported purpose of serving the separation of powers”). 
 29 See infra Section IV.A. (encouraging the adoption of communicative rather than literal 
meaning as the framework for statutory interpretation). 
 30 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018) (explaining that “Zadvydas represents 
a notably generous application of the constitutional-avoidance canon” in part because the 
Court had recognized an implied meaning that restricted broad statutory language). 
 31 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (describing clear statement rules). 
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mandate.”32  Thus, the avoidance canon resolves statutory ambiguity 
but does not “impl[y] limitations on otherwise unambiguous text.”33   
The Court’s distinction between the avoidance canon and clear 
statement rules thus depends on the Court’s view of language, which 
includes a focus on literal meaning and ambiguity.  This focus is ill-
conceived.  Part II argues that instead of using the judicially created 
concept of ambiguity, which depends on ideology rather than linguistic 
tests or useful definitions, courts should focus on the multiple ways in 
which a provision might be indeterminate.  In turn, as Part III explains, 
a broader notion of indeterminacy should be accompanied by a broader 
notion of statutory meaning that focuses on the communicative meaning 
of a text rather than merely its literal meaning.  Defining meaning in such 
a manner is important because a text’s communicative meaning often 
includes presuppositions, which denote implied background beliefs, the 
truth of which are taken for granted.34  When applicable, every 
substantive canon is based on a particular presupposition about the 
clarity of congressional drafting, which provides a basis for connecting 
the canon to the communicative meaning of a provision and resolving 
statutory indeterminacy in light of the presupposition.35  Utilizing 
presuppositions in this manner would require reconsideration of the 
Court’s undertheorized distinction between implied terms and 
ambiguity, as well as the relationship between the avoidance canon and 
clear statement rules. 
Finally, Part IV addresses two different categories of indeterminacy 
in which the presupposition underlying the avoidance canon can help 
guide a reviewing court in selecting an interpretation.  The first category 
illustrates the Court’s overreliance on the literal meanings of provisions 
and its failure to recognize the many situations where statutory 
language is indeterminate in the sense that an inference is required to 
precisify a provision in order to resolve the interpretive dispute.  The 
 
 32 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 141 (2005). 
 33 Id. at 140.  The Court reasoned that with the avoidance canon “the question was one of textual 
interpretation, not the scope of some implied exception.  The constitutional avoidance canon 
simply informed the choice among plausible readings of [the statute’s] text.”  Id. 
 34 See infra note 186 and accompanying text (explaining that presuppositions are a ubiquitous 
aspect of language). 
 35 The various presuppositions underlying substantive canons are generalized across time and 
subject matter, and thus are not always tied to specific legislative expectations at the time of 
enactment, making any connection to legislative intent at least partly fictional.  See infra 
Section III.D. (explaining the generalized nature of substantive canons). 
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Court’s recent, and highly consequential, cases challenging the 
constitutionality of prolonged immigration detention offer examples of 
this scenario.  The second category involves situations where a statutory 
term’s uncertain meaning presents a disputed range of applications.  
This Part uses the phrase “intangible right of honest services,” from 
Skilling v. United States,36 as an example of how courts should exercise 
discretion within the scope of indeterminacy to select a meaning that 
avoids serious constitutional issues.  In both the first and second 
scenarios, the role of the presupposition should be to help select a 
precisifying interpretation that does not conflict with the relevant 
legislative scheme even though it might be a second-best resolution of 
the indeterminacy.37 
 
I.  INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTERPRETATION 
Judges are often tempted to define ambiguity broadly in order to 
address situations where the literal meaning of a statutory provision is 
much broader in scope than the problem(s) the legislative scheme was 
designed to address.38  As this Part explains, labeling a provision as 
ambiguous allows a court to appeal to interpretive principles that would 
otherwise not typically be available, such as the avoidance canon and 
other substantive canons.  Although there is a long history of judicial 
narrowing of problematically broad statutes, this history is in tension 
with the Court’s view of ambiguity in recent avoidance canon cases.  In 
these cases, the Court has defined ambiguity narrowly, indicating a far 
more modest role for the avoidance canon than for clear statement 
rules.  In the Court’s view, the function of a clear statement rule, but not 
the avoidance canon, is to sometimes recognize an implied limitation on 
broad statutory language. 
 
 36 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010). 
 37 Thus, there must be sufficient indeterminacy to allow for an implied term without disrupting 
the legislative scheme designed by Congress.  See infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 38 See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Extremely Broad Laws, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 641 (2019) 
(documenting the problems that broad statutes create for courts).  It should not be surprising 
that statutory language that is general is a common source of interpretive problems.  Legal 
language follows non-legal language in many respects and a ubiquitous aspect of non-legal 
language is open-ended terms that can result in indeterminacy.  See infra IV.A. (explaining 
the concepts and sources of linguistic underdeterminacy and indeterminacy). 
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A.  Ambiguity as a Device that Sanctions Non-Literal Interpretations 
Consider a scenario involving a woman, CAB, who discovers that her 
husband is having an affair with her closest friend.  CAB seeks revenge 
against her (former) friend and spreads toxic chemicals on her friend’s 
property hoping that the friend will develop an uncomfortable rash.  
Federal prosecutors learn about CAB’s actions and charge her with 
violating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act 
(“Chemical Weapons Act”).39  The statute is quite broad, perhaps 
alarmingly so, forbidding any person knowingly “to develop, produce, 
otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, 
retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.”40  
The other operative provisions are defined in similarly broad terms.  For 
instance, a “chemical weapon” includes a “toxic chemical,” which is 
defined as  
any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can 
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans 
or animals.  The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their 
origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they 
are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.41 
Fearing a lengthy prison sentence, CAB would like the court to 
declare the Chemical Weapons Act unconstitutional.42  Alternatively, 
CAB would be satisfied with a narrow interpretation that would avoid 
the constitutional question but exclude her conduct from falling under 
the statute.  The challenge of such an interpretive argument is that the 
literal meaning of the statutory language is quite broad and covers CAB’s 
conduct.  The broad reach of the terms of the statute, if interpreted 
literally, would seem to undermine any resolution of the case in CAB’s 
favor because the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that a 
 
 39 See Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) 
(2017). 
 40 Id. 
 41 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A).  “Chemical weapon” is defined under the statute in relevant part as 
“[a] toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited 
under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.” § 
229F(1)(A).  A person who violates the statute may be subject to severe punishment: 
imprisonment “for any term of years,” or if a victim’s death results, the death penalty or 
imprisonment “for life.” § 229A(a). 
 42 One possible claim is that the statute is not a necessary and proper means of executing the 
federal government’s power to make treaties.  See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 855 
(2014) (noting that the parties in the case had “devoted significant effort to arguing whether 
[the statute at issue] is a necessary and proper means of executing the National Government’s 
power to make treaties”). 
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precondition for application of the avoidance canon is a judicial finding 
of “ambiguity.”43 
Of course, the situation described above involved a real case (CAB 
being Carol Anne Bond), where the Supreme Court, in Bond v. United 
States,44 found the statute to be “ambiguous” and narrowed its meaning, 
despite the lack of linguistic uncertainty regarding the reach of its 
terms.45  Specifically, the Court found that 
the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key 
statutory definition given the term—“chemical weapon”—being 
defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless 
reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context 
from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and 
terrorism.46 
Having found ambiguity, the Court could then refer to “basic principles 
of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve [the] ambiguity.”47 
Less frequently, judges also define ambiguity broadly in order to 
address situations where the literal meaning of a statutory provision is 
much narrower in scope than the problem(s) the legislative scheme was 
designed to address.  In King v. Burwell,48 one of the most discussed 
statutory interpretation cases in recent memory, the problem was an 
underinclusive provision rather than an overbroad one.  In interpreting 
one of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) key provisions referring only to 
“State” as including both federal and state governments, the Court based 
its ambiguity determination on the consequences of a literal 
interpretation.49  The Court reasoned that a literal interpretation would 
“make little sense,” and thus that “when read in context,” the relevant 
provisions were “properly viewed as ambiguous.”50  The finding of 
ambiguity allowed the Court to “avoid the type of calamitous result that 
Congress plainly meant to avoid” and gave it justification for 
 
 43 See infra Section II.A. (describing the ambiguity trigger). 
 44 572 U.S. 844, 855 (2014). 
 45 Id. at 860–61.  The literal meanings of the terms of the statute clearly covered Bond’s conduct, 
although, as with any statute, there are possible scenarios where coverage could be 
contested.  Id. at 861. 
 46 Id. at 860. 
 47 Id. at 859. 
 48 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
49  Id. at 487–88. 
 50 Id. at 487–491. 
May 2021] CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 605 
“interpret[ing] the Act in a way that” improves health insurance markets 
and does not destroy them.51 
By relying on contextual evidence even in the face of semantic clarity, 
the Court in Bond and Burwell sought the meaning communicated by 
the text, rather than just its literal meaning, thereby implicitly signaling 
that semantic clarity does not necessarily preclude a finding of 
ambiguity.52  As Justice Scalia argued in both cases, the semantic 
meaning of the relevant language was clear.53  Consider that in Burwell 
the Court recognized that it was choosing an interpretation that 
deviated from the literal meaning of the provision, indicating that “the 
context and structure of the Act compel us to depart from what would 
otherwise be the most natural reading of the pertinent statutory 
phrase.”54  After all, the ACA’s definition of “State” as meaning “each of 
the 50 States and the District of Columbia” was straightforward and 
clearly excluded the federal government.55  Neither the government nor 
the Court was attempting to interpret the ACA’s definition of “State,” 
determine the term’s ordinary meaning or, in any genuine sense, declare 
that the term must be given some special technical meaning in light of 
the context. 
B.  The Different Functions of Interpretive Principles 
The Court’s decisions in Bond and Burwell illustrate the justificatory 
benefits of declaring a provision “ambiguous” as a means of narrowing 
the scope of dangerously broad statutes or, less often, broadening overly 
narrow statutes.  Labeling a provision as “ambiguous” allows a court to 
appeal to interpretive principles that would otherwise not typically be 
available, such as the avoidance canon and other substantive canons.  As 
exemplified best in Burwell, a judicial determination of ambiguity even 
allows a court to be explicitly guided by the policy consequences of 
 
 51 Id. at 498. 
 52 As explained below, the Court sought the communicative meanings of the statutes.  See infra 
Section II.C.  (contrasting Bond and Burwell with the Court’s other ambiguity cases). 
 53 See Burwell, 576 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is hard to come up with a clearer way 
to limit tax credits to state Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by the State.’”).  See 
also Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. at 867 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is clear beyond doubt 
that [the statute] covers what Bond did; and we have no authority to amend it.”). 
 54 Burwell, 576 U.S. at 497. 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (2012). 
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possible interpretations.56  Correlatively, the significance of a finding of 
ambiguity illustrates the distinction between interpretive principles 
that determine the linguistic meaning of a provision and those that serve 
other functions, such as avoiding the linguistic meaning or resolving 
ambiguity.57 
In some way, although often imperfectly, courts attempt to 
determine the linguistic meaning of a statute as part of the process of 
giving it some legal meaning.  Classifying an interpretive principle as one 
that helps to determine the linguistic meaning of a provision is 
important due to the legitimization such a justification provides.  
Compare, for example, the absurdity doctrine and textual canons.  Recall 
that the absurdity doctrine authorizes judicially created departures 
from the literal meaning of a statutory provision when that meaning 
would result in absurdity.58  Even if well accepted, much of the debate 
surrounding the absurdity doctrine concerns how to define the doctrine 
narrowly in light of the judiciary’s role as the “faithful agent” of 
Congress.59  In contrast, textual canons, which represent presumptions 
about general language usage drawn from the drafter’s choice of words, 
typically present different justificatory issues.60  With textual canons, 
instead of a debate that focuses on their compatibility with the proper 
judicial role, criticism typically centers on whether a particular textual 
canon represents an accurate presumption about language usage.61 
 
 56 More controversially, as in Bond and Burwell, the policy consequences of a literal meaning 
interpretation may convince a court that the provision is ambiguous.  See infra notes 142–51 
and accompanying text (addressing arguments that labeling a provision as ambiguous 
because of the consequences of a literal meaning interpretation involves circular reasoning). 
 57 This Article makes an important distinction between the “literal meaning” of a text and its 
potentially broader “communicative meaning.”  See supra note 17 (defining “literal 
meaning”).  See also infra Section III.A. (defining “communicative meaning”).  In various 
places in this Article, however, it is useful to refer to a generic, general “linguistic meaning” 
of a provision which does not distinguish between literal and communicative meaning. 
 58 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text (describing the absurdity doctrine). 
 59 See Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 221, 231 (2013) (“The traditional understanding of statutory interpretation is that the 
judiciary should serve as a faithful agent of the legislature”). 
 60 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 634 (2d ed. 1995) (describing textual canons as those that 
“set forth inferences that are usually drawn from the drafter’s choice of words, their 
grammatical placement, in sentences, and their relationship to other parts of the ‘whole’ 
statute.”). 
 61 See BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 181–202 (2015) (analyzing whether textual canons help determine the 
ordinary meaning of a legal text). 
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The interpretive category into which an interpretive principle is 
placed thus determines the sort of justification required to situate it as 
an aspect of legal interpretation.  It is thus intuitive that courts are 
motivated to categorize a favored interpretive principle as an aspect of 
linguistic meaning rather than contributing to a deviation from it.62  
Although the linguistic meaning of a text is not always dispositive, 
because courts sometimes choose interpretations that diverge from it, 
judicial consideration of an interpretive principle that determines 
linguistic meaning is per se legitimate.63  Thus, a determinant of 
linguistic meaning generally does not need any further normative 
legitimization.64  In contrast, interpretive principles that are not aspects 
of linguistic meaning require a demonstration of compatibility with the 
proper judicial function.65  This sort of legitimization is comparatively 
straightforward if the linguistic meaning of the text is “ambiguous” and 
the interpretive principle is a means of resolving the indeterminacy.66  
Conversely, legitimization is more challenging if, like the absurdity 
 
 62 This follows from the commitment of judges to act as the “faithful agents” of Congress in 
matters of statutory interpretation and the default assumption that Congress intends for legal 
texts to be given their ordinary meanings.  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 
(2009) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the 
assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose.” (citations omitted)). 
 63 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 
1123 (2017) (“Because language depends on practice, a linguistic rule stands or falls by its 
use”). 
 64 While an interpretive principle that helps determine linguistic meaning does not need any 
further normative justification, not all determinants of communicative meaning are 
considered legitimate by all judges.  For example, supporters of legislative history claim that 
it helps determine the communicative meaning of a text, while critics argue that for various 
reasons it is not a valid source of interpretive evidence.  See generally John F. Manning, 
Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529 
(2000) (discussing the objections to legislative history). 
 65 A proper judicial function may be to resolve ambiguity in a way that is compatible with the 
normative values of the legal system or consistent with legislative expectations, but in either 
case a judge must connect the interpretive principle to some legitimate goal.  More difficult 
justifications are required when interpretive principles run counter to likely legislative 
expectations but are not mandated by the Constitution.  See generally Einer Elhauge, 
Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002) (offering 
theories of why some interpretive principles run counter to likely legislative preferences). 
 66 Thus, the use of legislative history is less controversial when it resolves ambiguity than when 
it is used to avoid the communicative meaning of a text.  See Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 
S. Ct. 1804, 1814 (2019) (“[E]ven those of us who believe that clear legislative history can 
‘illuminate ambiguous text’ won’t allow ‘ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear 
statutory language.’” (quoting Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 52 U.S. 562, 572 (2011))). 
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doctrine, the interpretive principle neither determines the linguistic 
meaning of a provision nor is not a device to resolve ambiguity.67 
Despite the Court’s occasional claims that the avoidance canon is 
consistent with congressional expectations, the Court also maintains 
that it is a device for resolving statutory ambiguity.68  Like other 
substantive canons, the basic function of the avoidance canon is to 
restrict the domains of statutes.69  That is, substantive canons tend to 
reduce the number of situations to which the statute may potentially 
apply, in accordance with the normative policy underlying the canon.  
The conventional view is that these restrictions are not based on general 
principles of language usage that apply outside of the law.70  Instead, 
substantive canons, also referred to as “normative canons” among other 
terms,71 are “presumptions about statutory meaning based upon 
substantive principles or policies drawn from the common law, other 
statutes, or the Constitution.”72  The strongest substantive canons are 
“clear statement rules” and require a court to avoid a particular result 
unless the statute (more clearly than usually required) indicates that 
the result was intended.73  In contrast, courts apply weaker substantive 
canons in order to resolve statutory ambiguity.74 
 
 67 For instance, legitimizing the rule of lenity (which directs courts to resolve ambiguity in favor 
of the criminal defendant) as a requirement of due process is much easier than an argument 
that a proper judicial function is to create penalty default rules that are designed to 
incentivize legislatures to be as clear as possible when drafting criminal statutes.  See Einer 
Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2139 n.368 
(2002) (describing the rule of lenity as a penalty default rule). 
 68 See infra note 225 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s views that the avoidance 
canon is consistent with legislative expectations). 
 69 Perhaps the classic explanation of how canons narrow meaning is David L. Shapiro, 
Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992). 
 70 See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109 
(2010) (describing the normative underpinnings of substantive canons). 
 71 See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn its Lonely 
Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (referring to substantive canons as “normative 
canons”). 
 72 ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 60, at 634. 
 73 See Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1959, 1959 (1994) (noting that clear statement rules “erect potential barriers to the 
straightforward effectuation of legislative intent”).  See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (arguing that the Court’s clear statement rules “amount to a 
‘backdoor’ version of the constitutional activism that most Justices on the current Court have 
publicly denounced”). 
 74 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 341 (2000) (explaining that courts apply weak substantive canons only after 
the traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail to reveal the statute’s meaning). 
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Substantive canons therefore function as directives that resolve 
statutory uncertainty, and the strength of a substantive canon depends 
on two elements: 1) the standard that must be met in order to overcome 
the meaning the canon directs courts to select, and 2) the other 
interpretive evidence that may be considered when evaluating whether 
the burden has been met.75  The scalability of substantive canons along 
these two dimensions accounts for how the canons operate.  For 
example, the relatively weak rule of lenity, often referred to as a tie-
breaker canon, is triggered by a judicial finding of ambiguity.76  The 
canon directs courts to consider all relevant determinants of meaning 
and requires the government only to establish that its interpretation is 
at least slightly superior to the defendant’s interpretation.77  Conversely, 
the presumption against retroactivity, often referred to as a clear-
statement rule, directs courts to select a prospective only interpretation 
unless the language of the provision clearly indicates that retroactive 
application was intended.78  Thus, in a criminal case the government has 
only a modest more-likely-than-not burden in order to avoid application 
of the rule of lenity, and can assert any determinant of meaning 
supporting its interpretation (such as legislative history), while a party 
arguing for retroactive application of a statute must demonstrate that 
specific language of the provision itself allows for retroactive 
application.79    
 
 75 Restricting the allowable determinants of meaning may thus result in a standard that is more 
difficult to overcome.  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 73, at 597 (distinguishing between 
a clear-statement approach that is willing to consider legislative history and “super-strong” 
clear-statement rules that can only be satisfied by a specific statement in the statutory text). 
 76 See Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420–28 (2006) (describing the 
rule of lenity and the common criticisms of it). 
 77 See John F. Stinneford, Dividing Crime, Multiplying Punishments, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1955, 
2029 (2015) (describing the “weak and theoretically bankrupt rule of lenity”).  Criticism of 
the weakness of the rule of lenity is long-standing.  See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, 
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198–99 (1985) (stating 
that the rule of lenity “survives more as a makeweight for results that seem right on other 
grounds than as a consistent policy of statutory interpretation”). 
 78 See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 384 (2005) (noting that the 
presumption against retroactively “often causes courts to infer exceptions to statutory 
provisions whose words, on their face, appear to cover all pending cases”). 
 79 Compare Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 264 (1994) (indicating that statutes “will 
not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result” 
(citation omitted)), with Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (indicating that “[t]he rule of 
lenity applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ . . . we can make 
‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.’” (citations omitted)). 
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C.  The Supreme Court’s Distinction Between Ambiguity and Implied 
Terms 
As the Bond and Burwell cases exemplify, the ambiguity concept 
often serves as a means of mediating between judicial observance of 
statutory dictates and policy based interpretive creativity, making the 
features and determination of ambiguity of significant importance.  The 
Court’s decision in Bond may seem (to some) to be part of a sensible and 
long-standing practice of judicial narrowing of problematically broad 
statutes,80 but its treatment of ambiguity is inconsistent with the Court’s 
view of ambiguity in recent avoidance canon cases.  Rather, as described 
below, in these cases the Court has defined “ambiguity” narrowly, 
making the trigger for the avoidance canon harder to satisfy.  
Furthermore, in focusing on the ambiguity of explicit statutory terms in 
avoidance canon cases, the Court has distinguished between the 
avoidance canon and clear statement rules on the basis that the function 
of a clear statement rule, but not the avoidance canon, is to sometimes 
recognize an implied limitation on broad statutory language. 
The Court’s ambiguity trigger for the avoidance canon, as well as the 
Court’s efforts to distinguish between the avoidance canon and clear 
statement rules, can be illustrated through several recent cases, some of 
which involved challenges to prolonged immigration detention.81                                                                                                                                                      
In Nielsen v. Preap,82 and Jennings v. Rodriguez,83 cases involving 
challenges to the extended detention without bond hearings of 
immigrants during the pendency of immigration proceedings, the Court 
reaffirmed that “ambiguity” must be found before the avoidance canon 
can be applied.84  Rodriguez, the more illustrative case for present 
purposes, involved a class-action lawsuit challenging the detention 
 
 80 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in 
Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1021 (2001) (finding a large 
“number of cases narrowing broad statutory language under courts’ ameliorative powers”). 
 81 Although this Article uses immigration detention cases as examples, there is no reason to 
believe that the Court applies a narrower version of the avoidance canon in such cases.  In 
fact, the Court has historically used the avoidance canon quite aggressively in immigration 
cases.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 547 (1990) (describing 
the Court’s aggressive use of the avoidance canon in immigration cases). 
 82 Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019). 
 83 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 84 See id. at 842–44 (focusing on the requirement of ambiguity and emphasizing the “clear 
language” of the relevant provisions); see also Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 972 (citations omitted) 
(“The [avoidance] canon ‘has no application’ absent ‘ambiguity.’”). 
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without bond hearings of certain immigrants during the course of 
immigration proceedings.85  The class members had been detained for 
an average of one year, with many detained for significantly longer 
periods of time.86  The immigrants fell into multiple categories, but the 
relevant statutory provisions do not explicitly provide for a general 
entitlement to a bond hearing or contain explicit restrictions on the 
length of detention.87  Instead, the provisions mandate detention in 
certain circumstances (without providing any explicit language 
regarding the length of detention) and give the Attorney General the 
authority in certain circumstances to temporarily parole immigrants 
from detention.88  The Court, applying the expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius canon, reasoned that the express provision for parole in a 
separate provision “implies that there are no other circumstances under 
which aliens detained under § 1225(b) may be released.”89  
Part of the context for Rodriguez was the Court’s earlier decision in 
Zadvydas v. Davis.90 As opposed to Rodriguez, which involved 
immigrants detained during immigration proceedings, Zadvydas 
involved the detention of immigrants already ordered deported by 
immigration courts.91  The government claimed it had authority under 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to indefinitely detain immigrants who had been 
ordered deported but could not be transferred to other countries.92  
Section 1231(a)(6) provides as follows: 
An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible . . . [2] [or] removable 
[as a result of violations of status requirements or entry conditions, 
violations of criminal law, or reasons of security or foreign policy] or [3] 
who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the 
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be 
 
 85 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836. 
 86 Id. at 860 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 87 See id. at 843 (majority opinion) (“Nothing in the text of § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) even 
hints that those provisions restrict detention after six months . . . .”). 
 88 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (outlining detention pending credible fear interviews and 
consideration of applications for asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (explaining the procedure for 
discretionary detention pending a decision on removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (mandating 
detention pending a decision on removal based on commission of certain crimes); 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(d)(5)(A) (authorizing Attorney General’s parole authority “for urgent humanitarian 
reasons or significant public benefit . . .”). 
 89 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 844. 
 90 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 91 Id. at 684–85. 
 92 See id. at 688–89 (noting the government’s argument in its brief that the statute should be 
read as permitting indefinite detention). 
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detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to 
[certain] terms of supervision. 
Because the government’s interpretation of the statute raised a 
serious constitutional issue by authorizing the government to 
indefinitely detain aliens who legally are considered to have entered the 
country, the Court invoked the avoidance canon.93  Despite “[t]he 
Government[’s] argu[ment] that the statute means what it literally 
says,”94 the Court “read an implicit limitation into the statute.”95 The 
Court’s limitation of a six-month period of detention unless there is a 
“significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 
future”96 was more implied in law than in fact and could not be traced to 
the Congress that enacted § 1231(a)(6).97  The Court justified its 
interpretation in part by noting that it had in the past “read significant 
limitations into other immigration statutes in order to avoid their 
constitutional invalidation.”98 
Despite conceding that it was “read[ing] an implicit limitation into 
the statute,” the Court in Zadvydas nevertheless attempted to identify 
an ambiguity in the explicit terms of § 1231(a)(6).99  The Court focused 
on the “may be detained” phrase and argued that “while ‘may’ suggests 
discretion, it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion.  In that 
respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”100  The Court in Rodriguez agreed 
that the identification of an ambiguous explicit term was crucial to the 
decision in Zadvydas, emphasizing (repeatedly) that the Court in 
Zadvydas “defended its resort to [the avoidance] canon on the ground 
that” the phrase “may be detained” (emphasis added by the Court) 
 
 93 Id. at 692.  The Court was careful to distinguish for the constitutional analysis between 
immigrants who had entered the United States, such as the immigrants in this case, and those 
who had been stopped at the border.  See id. at 693 (“The distinction between an alien who 
has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs throughout 
immigration law.”). 
 94 Id. at 689; see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005) (citation omitted) (“As the 
Court in Zadvydas recognized, the statute can be construed ‘literally’ to authorize indefinite 
detention . . . .”). 
 95 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 
 96 Id. at 701. 
 97 The Court did not point to any evidence that the Congress that enacted § 1231(a)(6) had ever 
considered the issue of indefinite detention and relied instead on a statement from legislative 
history from forty years earlier.  See infra note 305 and accompanying text. 
 98 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 
 99  Id. 
 100 Id. at 697. 
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rendered “§ 1231(a)(6) . . . ambiguous.”101  Similarly, Clark v. Martinez 
was a follow-up case to Zadvydas involving immigrants considered to 
have been stopped at the border and whose detention would not raise 
serious constitutional issues.102  Nevertheless, the Court applied the 
same implicit six-month limitation on detention in § 1231(a)(6), 
emphasizing that it used the avoidance canon in Zadvydas as a “tool for 
choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory 
text.”103 
Although Zadvydas involved both an implicit limitation and the 
perceived ambiguity of an explicit term, the Court has framed the case, 
and more broadly the avoidance canon, as turning on the determination 
of the ambiguity of explicit terms.  In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line 
Ltd, the Court decided whether the “internal affairs clear statement 
rule,” which requires a clear statement of congressional intent before a 
general statutory requirement can interfere with matters that concern 
a foreign-flag vessel’s internal affairs and operations, created an implied 
limitation on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).104  The Court, 
in ruling that the clear statement rule created implied limitations on 
some aspects of the ADA but not others, distinguished the situation from 
the one in Martinez.  The Court explained that the “internal affairs clear 
statement rule is an implied limitation on otherwise unambiguous 
general terms of the statute,” similar to clear statement rules such as the 
presumption against extraterritorially.105  While the avoidance canon’s 
function is to “choos[e] among plausible meanings of an ambiguous 
statute,” a clear statement rule “implies a special substantive limit on 
the application of an otherwise unambiguous mandate.”106  Thus, the 
avoidance canon resolves statutory ambiguity but does not “impl[y] 
limitations on otherwise unambiguous text.”107  Martinez and Zadvydas 
therefore “give[] full respect to the distinction between rules for 
 
 101 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 843 (2018). 
 102 543 U.S. 368, 373–74 (2005). 
 103 Id. at 381. 
 104 545 U.S. 119, 125 (2005) (noting that, while “[o]ur cases hold that a clear statement of 
congressional intent is necessary before a general statutory requirement can interfere with 
matters that concern a foreign-flag vessel’s internal affairs and operations,” that rule “is 
inapplicable to many other duties Title III might impose”). 
 105 Id. at 139 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991)). 
 106 Id. at 141. 
 107 Id. at 140.  The Court reasoned that “the question was one of textual interpretation, not the 
scope of some implied exception.  The constitutional avoidance canon simply informed the 
choice among plausible readings of § 1231(a)(6)’s text.”  Id. 
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resolving textual ambiguity and implied limitations on otherwise 
unambiguous text.”108  
Despite the Court’s efforts in Martinez and Spector to frame the 
Zadvydas decision as one merely involving resolution of the ambiguity 
of an explicit term, the Court in Rodriguez claimed that “Zadvydas 
represents a notably generous application of the constitutional-
avoidance canon.”109  The Zadvydas decision, though, was not 
particularly noteworthy in that respect.  Contrary to the Court’s 
assertions in Spector and Rodriguez, the Court has imposed implicit 
restrictions on the scope of statutes through the avoidance canon 
without also identifying a linguistic ambiguity.110  A well-known 
example of this occurred in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, where 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had interpreted its 
jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as giving it 
authority over schools that were “religiously associated.”111  The Court, 
relying on the avoidance canon, rejected the agency’s interpretation and 
held that the NLRA did not grant the NLRB jurisdiction over religiously 
associated schools.112  The statute, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), defined 
“employer” broadly and explicitly included several exceptions from the 
definition (none of which covered religiously associated schools).113  
Instead of framing its analysis in terms of whether one of the explicit 
statutory terms was ambiguous, the Court indicated that “the question 
we consider . . . is whether Congress intended the Board to have 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 843 (2018). 
 110 Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 400 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A disturbing number 
of this Court’s cases have applied the canon of constitutional doubt to statutes that were on 
their face clear.”). 
 111 440 U.S. at 492–93. 
 112 Id. at 507.  The Court also described the avoidance canon in terms that suggested 
comparability to a clear statement rule than a device to resolve ambiguity, stating that if the 
agency’s interpretation would raise serious constitutional questions, the Court “must first 
identify ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” before accepting that 
interpretation.  Id. at 501. 
 113 Section 152(2) states: 
The term ‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly 
or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned 
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political 
subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. 151 et 
seq.], as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when 
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such 
labor organization. 
  29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2018). 
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jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools.”114  In the view of 
the Court, 
[n]either the language of the statute nor its legislative history discloses 
any affirmative intention by Congress that church-operated schools be 
within the NLRB’s jurisdiction, and, absent a clear expression of 
Congress’ intent to bring teachers of church-operated schools within 
the NLRB’s jurisdiction, the Court will not construe the Act in such a way 
as would call for the resolution of difficult and sensitive First 
Amendment questions.115 
Like in Zadvydas, the Court in Catholic Bishop created an implicit 
limitation on the scope of the statute.  In fact, the Court in Catholic 
Bishop was arguably more aggressive in its interpretation considering 
that § 152(2) already contained explicit exceptions to the definition of 
“employer,” indicating that Congress had affirmatively considered the 
desired scope of the provision.116  In any case, the Court’s recent 
statements that the avoidance canon cannot sanction implied 
limitations ignore cases, such as Catholic Bishop, that contradict such 
claims. 
As framed by the Court, the avoidance canon is thus dissimilar from 
both clear statement rules and weak tie-breaker canons like the rule of 
lenity.  Like tie-breaker canons, the avoidance canon is triggered by 
ambiguity and, in the view of the Court, requires “ordinary textual 
analysis”117 and “does not supplant traditional modes of statutory 
interpretation.”118  Yet, unlike tie-breaker canons, the avoidance canon 
explicitly authorizes second-best interpretations by providing that the 
avoiding interpretation must merely be “fairly possible.”119  Even so, the 
Court has at times defined “ambiguity” narrowly, making the trigger for 
the canon harder to satisfy, and has distinguished clear statement rules 
 
 114 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500.  In a dissenting opinion in Rodriguez, Justice Breyer framed 
the issue before the Court in similar terms, stating that “I would also ask whether the statute’s 
purposes suggest a congressional refusal to permit bail where confinement is prolonged.  The 
answer is ‘no.’  There is nothing in the statute or in the legislative history that reveals any 
such congressional intent.”  138 S.Ct. at 872 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 490. 
 116 See id. at 511–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the eight express exceptions).  As Justice 
Brennan noted in dissent, “those familiar with the legislative process know that explicit 
expressions of congressional intent in such broadly inclusive statutes are not commonplace.  
Thus, by strictly or loosely applying its requirement, the Court can virtually remake 
congressional enactments.”  Id. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 117 See Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. at 842 (indicating that the avoidance canon “comes into play only . . . 
after the application of ordinary textual analysis”). 
 118 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787 (2008). 
 119 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). 
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from the avoidance canon on the basis of how the respective 
interpretive principles interact with linguistic meaning.  Despite the 
counterexamples such as Catholic Bishop, the Court has asserted that 
clear statement rules can create implied exceptions but the avoidance 
canon only resolves ambiguity.  Thus, in the Court’s view, implied 
meanings and ambiguity are distinct phenomena where a finding of 
ambiguity regarding an explicit term is required in order to license 
implied language in avoidance canon cases (and even that is disfavored, 
“notably generous” interpretation),120 but in clear statement cases there 
is no such precondition for implied language.121 
 
II.  THE AVOIDANCE CANON’S FLAWED AMBIGUITY TRIGGER 
 The concept of ambiguity thus triggers application of the 
avoidance canon, but the Court has applied the ambiguity concept 
inconsistently, as the examples discussed in Part I illustrate.  Part II 
explains how the judicial conception of ambiguity differs in important 
ways from how linguists define ambiguity, making the ambiguity trigger 
a legal doctrine subject to jurisprudential commitments and biases 
rather than a neutral linguistic one.  The result is an undertheorized 
concept that is both too broad (by combining ambiguity identification 
and disambiguation) and too narrow (by not recognizing the various 
forms of indeterminacy), and which serves poorly its function of 
mediating between judicial observance of statutory dictates and policy 
based interpretive creativity. 
A.  The Unique Judicial Conception of Ambiguity 
Part of the problem with the ambiguity trigger is that, as defined by 
courts, it requires a potentially uncertain reorientation from the process 
 
 120 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 121 It is indisputable that in Zadvydas the Court recognized an implied limitation on detention 
limited to a “period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United 
States,” 533 U.S. at 689, but the Court found it necessary to first identify an ambiguity in the 
explicit language of the statute.  See id. at 697 (declaring that “may” is ambiguous).  The 
incoherence of needing to first recognize an ambiguity in explicit textual language prior to 
creating an implied term is explained by the Court’s focus on literal and explicit meanings, 
which often obscure the actual source of indeterminacy.  See infra Part V.A.1. (explaining how 
to view the indeterminacy at issue in Zadvydas). 
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of determining the “best reading” of a statute.122 When a serious 
constitutional issue is raised about a potential interpretation, courts 
attempt to determine the linguistic meaning of the provision as they 
would normally in order to determine the “best reading” of a statute.  At 
the same time, courts must also decide whether the provision is 
ambiguous in light of the same contextual cues that are considered in 
determining linguistic meaning.123  The interpretive process would be 
more straightforward if the ascertainment of ambiguity meant that the 
best reading of a statute could not be determined, but the two are not 
mutually exclusive.  Instead, the communicative meaning of a provision 
may be clear even when ambiguity is also present.  The reason is that 
ambiguity, as defined by linguists, is ubiquitous in natural languages but 
does not always impede successful communication.124  In fact, speakers 
often make their communications more efficient by utilizing ambiguity, 
as long as context is informative about meaning.125  Ambiguous 
expressions are therefore merely potentially indeterminate in the sense 
that the relevant context may disambiguate the expressions. 
Linguists often use devices, such as definitions and tests, to describe 
and identify ambiguity and distinguish it from disambiguation, as well 
as other forms of indeterminacy, such as vagueness and generality.126  In 
contrast, the concept of ambiguity as created by courts conflates the 
various forms of indeterminacy, and the determination tracks 
 
 122 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2144 (2016) 
(explaining how courts should typically seek to determine the “best reading” of a statute). 
 123 The Supreme Court has consistently asserted that “[a]mbiguity is a creature not of 
definitional possibilities but of statutory context.”  Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 
(1994). 
 124 See, e.g., Steven T. Piantadosi, Harry Tily & Edward Gibson, The Communicative Function of 
Ambiguity in Language, 122 COGNITION 280, 280 (2012) (“Ambiguity is a pervasive 
phenomenon in language which occurs at all levels of linguistic analysis.”). 
 125 See id. (“It is easy to justify ambiguity to anyone who is familiar with information theory.”); 
Hannah Rohde et al., 2012, Communicating with Cost-based Implicature: a Game-Theoretic 
Approach to Ambiguity, in PROCEEDINGS OF SEMDIAL 2012 (SEINEDIAL) 108 (Sarah Brown-
Schmidt et al. eds., 2012) (“Rather than avoiding ambiguity, speakers show behavior that is 
in keeping with theories of communicative efficiency that posit that speakers make rational 
decisions about redundancy and reduction.”). 
 126 See, e.g., Brendan S. Gillon, Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and Definitions, 
85 SYNTHESE 391, 393–95, 406–07 (1990).  Although linguists distinguish among different 
forms of indeterminacy, there is debate regarding the tests used to identify the different 
forms.  See, e.g., David Tuggy, Ambiguity, Polysemy, and Vagueness, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 
273, 273 (1993) (explaining that “[t]raditional linguistic tests for ambiguity vs. vagueness 
fail to yield clear judgments in such cases, and in fact can easily be made to yield opposing 
judgments by varying the context”).  The particular details of the debates are not relevant, 
though, because judges do not use any of the available tests to determine ambiguity. 
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disambiguation rather than ambiguity identification.127  Courts thus 
typically conflate ambiguity identification with disambiguation and 
consider broad contextual evidence for indications of legislative intent 
as part of the determination.128  Consequently, language that a linguist 
might identify as ambiguous is deemed by courts to be unambiguous if 
the relevant context can disambiguate the language.129  The judicially 
created ambiguity concept thus elides the separate issues of ambiguity 
identification and disambiguation, and the result is that the ambiguity 
determination depends on an assessment of the available evidence but 
without any linguistic tests or useful definitions to guide judges. 
B.  The Manipulability of the Ambiguity Determination 
Given the judicial conflation of ambiguity identification and 
disambiguation, the process of determining whether a provision is 
ambiguous is simply the normal interpretive process of determining 
statutory meaning (as the Court itself has indicated).130  Courts 
therefore necessarily seek to identify the semantic meaning of the 
language as well as make inferences about the meaning communicated 
by the text.131  Thus, a determination of ambiguity is based on a 
combination of general language usage (i.e., semantics) and the meaning 
of the language in some particular context (i.e., pragmatics).132  
Semantics concerns the conventional meaning of the representation and 
pragmatics the “contributions of the ambient circumstances.”133  The 
 
 127 See Brian G. Slocum, Replacing the Flawed Chevron Standard, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 195, 
219–23 (2018) (describing how courts conflate ambiguity identification and 
disambiguation). 
 128 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988) (citations omitted) (A statutory “provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is 
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the 
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the 
law.”). 
 129 See id.  Conversely, language a linguist might identify as unambiguous is sometimes deemed 
to be ambiguous by courts if the relevant context indicates that the textual meaning is 
problematic in some way.  For an example, see supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text 
(discussing King v. Burwell). 
 130 See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. 
 131 See Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading, 17 MIND & 
LANGUAGE 3 (2002) (explaining that the meaning produced by simply decoding word 
meanings vastly underdetermines the speaker’s meaning). 
 132 See SLOCUM, supra note 61, at 107–09 (explaining how legal interpretation depends on both 
generalizations about language usage and inferences from the specific context of the statute). 
 133 PRASHANT PARIKH, LANGUAGE AND EQUILIBRIUM 6 (2010). 
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traditional conception is that semantics “first underspecifies content 
that is later filled in by pragmatics.”134  Semantics therefore accounts for 
meaning by relating, via the rules of the language and abstracting away 
from specific contexts, linguistic expressions to the world objects to 
which they refer.135  Thus, the semantic meaning of a sentence consists 
of the “common core of meaning shared by every utterance of it.”136  In 
turn, pragmatics accounts for meaning by reference to the language user 
(producer or interpreter), and it involves inferential processes.137  
Pragmatics takes account of contextual factors, such as the mutual 
knowledge shared by the speaker and addressee, even if such 
information is not explicitly reflected in the syntactic properties of the 
sentence.138 
The consideration of pragmatic evidence focuses the interpreter’s 
attention on the entire communicative context rather than a single term 
or sentence considered in isolation.  The process will thus involve the 
interpreter making inferences from context, which means that 
conventional word meanings, and other objective determinants of 
meaning, will not provide the sole basis for determining ambiguity.139  
In fact, ignoring pragmatic (i.e., contextual) evidence results in the 
interpreter not taking sufficient note of the circumstances which 
regulate language comprehension.140  While conventional meanings are 
important, context-specific pragmatic information can always shape 
and change the ultimate meaning of the communication.141  The 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 See MIRA ARIEL, DEFINING PRAGMATICS 6 (2010) (describing the “semantics/pragmatics 
division of labor”).  A semantic meaning is therefore compositional (i.e., rule-governed) and 
convention based.  See id. at 24.  The principle of compositionality states that the “meaning 
of a complex linguistic expression is built up from the meanings of its composite parts in a 
rule-governed fashion.”  M. LYNNE MURPHY & ANU KOSKELA, KEY TERMS IN SEMANTICS 36 (2010).  
Thus, a sentence is compositional if its meaning is the sum of the meanings of its parts and of 
the relations of the parts. 
 136 DAN SPERGER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION 9 (1986). 
 137 See generally ARIEL, supra note 135. 
 138 See id. at 28. 
 139 See Varol Akman, Rethinking Context as a Social Construct, 32 J. PRAGMATICS 743, 745 (2000) 
(explaining how “[c]ontext is . . . a crucial factor in communication”). 
 140 See Elin Fredsted, On Semantic and Pragmatic Ambiguity, 30 J. PRAGMATICS 527, 532 (1998) 
(explaining that ambiguity is manifest in the use of language where “a stable logical-semantic 
kernel of meaning exists” that is “overlaid by an unstable context specific pragmatic 
meaning”). 
 141 See id.  In fact, many scholars agree with the “linguistic underdeterminacy thesis,” which 
holds that “[t]he linguistically encoded meaning of a sentence radically underdetermines the 
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decoding aspect of interpretation, which involves semantic evidence, 
and the inferential aspect of interpretation, which involves pragmatic 
evidence, thus require a weighing of the probative value of the 
(potentially conflicting) sources of meaning in general, as well as a 
weighing of the information each determinate generates in any 
particular interpretive dispute. 
With legal interpretation, accounting for both semantic and 
pragmatic evidence in the ambiguity determination involves familiar 
debates about the weighing of semantic meaning and contextual 
evidence, a process which makes the ambiguity determination both 
subjective and subject to jurisprudential commitments.  Consider again 
Bond and Burwell, where the Court viewed ambiguity in a broad sense.  
This broad conception of ambiguity included a view of context akin to 
the “totality of the knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions that are shared 
by the speaker and the listener, a.k.a. the common ground,” which would 
allow for consideration of the consequences of a possible 
interpretation.142  Justice Scalia, in his Bond concurrence, argued for a 
narrower conception of ambiguity that would make improper the 
Court’s reliance on the consequences of the government’s 
interpretation.143  In Justice Scalia’s view, a reviewing court should apply 
“traditional interpretive tools” before concluding that a provision is 
ambiguous.144  As a result, the Court’s reasoning “that a statute can be 
ambiguous because it threatens the balance of federal and state power” 
was flawed because “[t]here does not seem to be any textual ambiguity 
in the law.”145  Other commentators have agreed with Justice Scalia’s 
view of ambiguity and have argued that the Court’s reasoning in Bond 
was circular.146  These claims are wrong, though, in light of the manner 
in which the Court purports to determine ambiguity.  If a judicial 
 
proposition a speaker expresses when he or she utters that sentence.”  Yan Huang, Neo-
Gricean Pragmatics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 70 (Yan Huang ed., 2017). 
 142 See Akman, supra note 139, at 746 (explaining that context can include “(i) the words around 
a word, phrase, statement, etc. often used to help explain (fix) the meaning; [and] (ii) the 
general conditions (circumstances) in which an event, action, etc. takes place”); CHRISTINE 
GUNLOGSON, TRUE TO FORM : RISING AND FALLING DECLARATIVES AS QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH 39 (2014) 
(indicating that “the Common Ground . . . is a set of propositions representing what the 
participants in a discourse take to be mutually believed, or at least mutually assumed for the 
purposes of the discourse.”). 
 143 See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 868–71 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 144 Id. at 869. 
 145 Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 2151–52. 
 146 See id. (“From a textualist standpoint . . . Bond is hard to defend” and that “[t]he problem with 
the Court’s opinion . . . is the logical circularity at its core.”). 
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determination of ambiguity is a conclusion, at the end of a process of 
“traditional” statutory interpretation, that the meaning communicated 
by the provision does not select only one meaning, relevant evidence of 
meaning includes pragmatic inferences that include the assignment of 
reasonable intentions to the author.147  Thus, considering the 
consequences of a particular interpretation is consistent with the 
Court’s repeated assertion that application of the avoidance canon 
furthers congressional intent because Congress does not intend its 
legislative efforts to raise serious constitutional questions.148  A failure 
to take account of such evidence is an indication that the interpretive 
process is dependent on jurisprudential commitments rather than 
linguistic principles. 
The causes of interpretive dissensus in ambiguity determinations 
are thus the same as the causes of interpretive dissensus generally.  
Divergent outcomes may result from meta-normative disagreements 
about the respective weight that should be given generally to semantic 
and pragmatic evidence.  For instance, textualists like Justice Scalia 
argue that semantic meaning should be highly influential if not 
dispositive in determining the legal meaning of a provision, and thus a 
provision’s clear semantic meaning cannot be changed by pragmatic 
evidence.149  Divergent outcomes also result from judicially imposed 
restrictions on consideration of evidential sources, disagreements 
about the persuasive weight that should be given an individual 
evidential source in a general sense and in any particular case, as well 
as disagreements about how to resolve conflicts among conflicting 
evidential sources.  For example, some judges, but not others, restrict 
certain pragmatic sources of meaning such as legislative history or, 
alternatively, give it little persuasive weight generally or in a particular 
case, meaning that the same interpretive information may be given a 
 
 147 See Nicholas Allott & Benjamin Shaer, Legal Speech and the Elements of Adjudication, in THE 
NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION FROM 
LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 191–214 (Brian G. Slocum ed., 2017) (arguing that legal 
interpretation should be defined broadly as being a variety of verbal communication that is 
consistent with ordinary speech and which involves various inferences about the legislature). 
 148 See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 149 See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 91 
(2006) (“Textualists give primacy to the semantic context—evidence about the way a 
reasonable person conversant with relevant social and linguistic practices would have used 
the words.”). 
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different persuasive value by different judges.150  These evidential 
decisions are typically based at least partly on normative concerns 
specific to the law (e.g., a belief that considering legislative history is in 
tension with the legislative process required by the Constitution) rather 
than valid linguistic principles that reflect how language functions.151 
C.  Assessing Ambiguity as a Trigger 
The avoidance canon’s ambiguity trigger is thus problematic for 
various, interrelated reasons that reveal it as a legal rather than a 
linguistic doctrine.  First, it is an umbrella concept that conflates the 
various separate ways in which a statute might be indeterminate, which 
contributes to the uncertainty of its determination.152  Second, the 
ambiguity trigger creates interpretive uncertainty by providing a 
standard for the adoption of a second-best interpretation that departs 
from the normal judicial function of selecting the best reading of a 
statute.153  That the intended meaning of a communication may be 
ascertainable even though its language may be linguistically ambiguous 
only increases the uncertainty associated with the ambiguity 
standard.154 Furthermore, the conflation of ambiguity and 
disambiguation allows for interpretive dissensus based on ideological 
grounds and makes the ambiguity determination dependent on 
subjective assessments of the evidence.155  The Court is thus able to 
 
 150 Various scholars, as well as judges, have criticized the legitimacy and usefulness of legislative 
history to statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the 
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 
(1998) (questioning the judiciary’s ability accurately to discern legislative intent from 
legislative history).  A judge will tend to have some conception of the persuasive value of 
legislative history as a general matter.  Cf. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and 
Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist 
Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220 (2006) (examining the decline in the use of legislative history).  Even 
if the judge supports the use of legislative history as a general matter, the judge must 
determine its probative value in any individual case.  Furthermore, the legislative history may 
conflict with one or more interpretive principles, forcing the judge to determine the value of 
those interpretive principles in the particular case and to weigh that value against the 
information provided by the legislative history. 
 151 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) 
(arguing that legislative history creates an opportunity for legislative self-delegation, 
contrary to the clear assumptions of the constitutional structure). 
 152 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 153 See supra note 129and accompanying text. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See supra notes 143–52 and accompanying text (discussing divergent outcomes that result 
from various strategies for interpreting ambiguity). 
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arbitrarily define and determine ambiguity, such as by focusing only on 
the ambiguity of explicit terms, while still maintaining that the 
ambiguity concept is a neutral linguistic principle.156  Rather than acting 
as a neutral trigger, the ambiguity concept therefore adds to the 
arbitrariness of the Court’s application of the avoidance canon but 
without being an inherently mandatory component of the canon. 
 
III.  PRESUPPOSITIONS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Instead of ambiguity, the linguistic concepts of indeterminacy and 
presupposition should serve to trigger the avoidance canon and situate 
it within the interpretive process.  These concepts, though, function best 
within a certain understanding of meaning and communication.  This 
Part thus begins with a brief description of communicative meaning that 
should be general and uncontroversial.  With an understanding of 
communicative meaning in mind, the linguistic concept of 
presupposition is then introduced as the theory that situates the 
avoidance canon within the structure of interpretation.  Although 
fictional to some degree in its application to substantive canons, the 
presupposition concept can provide a framework for understanding the 
avoidance canon, as well as other substantive canons, as aspects of the 
communicative meaning of a provision.  One result of such an 
understanding is that, contrary to the view of the Court as well as critics, 
an implied restriction is not necessarily an example of an extraordinary 
interpretation where the reviewing court has rewritten the statute.157  
The concept of presupposition should therefore require a 
reconsideration of the Court’s undertheorized distinction between 
implied terms and ambiguity, as well as the relationship between the 
avoidance canon and clear statement rules.158  Furthermore, the 
presupposition underlying the avoidance canon is consistent with a 
 
 156 See supra Part I.C.  
 157 See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S.Ct. 830, 843 (2018) (arguing that Zadvydas, which involved 
an implied provision, “represents a notably generous application of the constitutional-
avoidance canon”). 
 158 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–09 and accompanying text (describing the 
Court’s view of the relationship between ambiguity and implied terms). 
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requirement that indeterminacy, properly understood, is necessary to 
trigger the avoidance canon.159 
A.  A Description of Communicative Meaning 
One of the flaws of the Court’s ambiguity concept (especially in 
recent avoidance canon cases) is that it sometimes views meaning in an 
unduly restrictive way that emphasizes literal meaning and a narrow 
view of context.  This approach is flawed because it is “widely 
recognized that . . . in order to understand a text, we must understand 
more than what is encoded in the text itself . . . .  This broader 
comprehension, . . . which is closely connected with contextual 
knowledge, . . . [includes things that are] presupposed and/or implicated 
by the text.”160  A court must therefore appreciate that sometimes the 
meaning communicated by a statute differs from the literal meaning of 
the language. 
Consider how the communicative meaning of a legal text might be 
framed in a way that is consistent with traditional notions of the proper 
judicial role in interpretation.161  While definitions may of course vary, 
any adequate account of communicative meaning must consider the 
externality of legal interpretation and the concomitant necessity of 
applying generalized principles of language usage in light of the 
particularized context of a statute.162  Thus, communicative meaning 
might be framed something along the lines of the meaning an 
appropriate hearer would most reasonably take a speaker to be trying 
to convey in employing a given verbal vehicle in the given 
communicative-context.163  This definition of communicative meaning is 
 
 159 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of indeterminacy 
for application of the avoidance canon). 
 160 Marina Sbisà, Presupposition, Implicature and Context in Text Understanding, in MODELING 
AND USING CONTEXT: SECOND INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE, CONTEXT ’99, 
TRENTO, ITALY, SEPTEMBER 9-11, 1999 PROCEEDINGS 324 (Paolo Bouquet, Luciano Serafini, 
Patrick Brézillon, Massimo Benerecetti, & Francesca Castellani, eds., 1999). 
 161 “Communicative meaning” is not a term used by courts, but judges nevertheless determine 
the communicative meaning of statutes, even if they sometimes reject it.  See supra notes 16–
19 and accompanying text (describing the absurdity doctrine). 
 162 See supra notes 131–44 and accompanying text (explaining how interpreters account for 
both semantic and pragmatic evidence in determining the meaning of a communication). 
 163 See Brian G. Slocum, Conversational Implicatures and Legal Texts, 29 RATIO JURIS. 23, 24 
(2016) (describing communicative meaning); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist 
Methodology, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269, 271 (2017) (defining “communicative meaning” as “the 
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similar to how the goal of legal interpretation has long been defined.164  
By focusing on an objective hearer rather than the actual speaker, the 
definition frames the inquiry in terms of external determinants of 
meaning that represent valid principles of language usage rather than 
the internal intentions of the speaker.165  Nevertheless, the perceived 
intentions of the speaker are still relevant in various ways, including, for 
example, the identification of components of meaning that are implied 
rather than explicit.166  The definition therefore accounts for both the 
common judicial assertion that statutory language should be given its 
“ordinary meaning,” which relies on generalized principles of language 
usage,167 and the necessity that interpretation be made in light of the 
particularized context of the statute.168 
Note that the description of communicative meaning does not select 
between textualist and intentionalist/purposivist approaches to 
interpretation, other than to maintain that implied meanings are a 
 
linguistic meaning or communicative content of a text”); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative 
Content and Legal Content, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 479, 480–84 (2013) (distinguishing 
between communicative meaning and the legal meaning given a text). 
 164 Oliver Wendell Holmes emphasized the externality of legal interpretation more than one 
hundred years ago when he explained that the interpreter’s role is not to ask what the author 
meant to convey but instead determine “what those words would mean in the mouth of a 
normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used . . . .”  
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417–18 
(1898-1899). 
 165 The focus on external determinants of meaning is necessary because autoglottic space (a 
distance between the writing and the author(s)) is an inherent characteristic of legal texts.  
Courts must therefore create interpretive tools, such as the ordinary meaning concept, that 
are based on generalized, and often fictional, assumptions about authorial intent.  See 
generally Roy Harris, How Does Writing Restructure Thought?, 9 LANGUAGE AND 
COMMUNICATION 99 (1989) (explaining the concept of “autoglottic space” and how writing is 
different from oral communication). 
 166 See Kent Bach, Impliciture vs. Explicature: What’s the difference?, in EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION 
126, 126–27 (Belén Soria & Esther Romero eds., 2010) (explaining that speakers can 
communicate things that are not fully determined by the semantics of the uttered sentence). 
 167 See infra note 245 (claiming that traditional legal analysis does not provide an adequate 
account of making sense in law). 
 168 See Kent Bach, Context Dependence (such as it is), in THE CONTINUUM COMPANION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (M. Garcia-Carpintero & M. Kölbel, eds., 2012) (explaining that “the 
same sentence can be used to convey different things in different contexts”).  Thus, a 
determination of the communicative meaning of a statute must consider not only the 
conventional meanings of words, and correlatively sentences, but also the relevant context 
and overall legislative design of the statute. 
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natural aspect of textual language comprehension.169  After all, textualist 
approaches to interpretation purport to consider context and 
purpose,170 and intentionalist approaches consider general conventions 
of meaning.171  For instance, even when the interpreter has little 
independent access to the context (as textualists argue is often true with 
statutes), the interpreter can nevertheless “exploit all the details of the 
text in order to project as much of its context as [she] can.”172  
Distinctions among the competing interpretive approaches turn largely 
on whether to privilege semantic or pragmatic evidence, and the above 
description of communicative meaning indicates that both types of 
evidence are relevant but does not mandate that one source be 
privileged over another in cases where the evidence conflicts.173 
B.  Implied Restrictions on Unambiguous Text 
An understanding of communicative meaning provides a basis for 
concluding that part of the incoherence of the Court’s treatment of 
substantive canons, and its distinction between clear statement rules 
and the avoidance canon, stems from its unduly narrow view in 
avoidance canon cases of the different ways in which a text can 
communicate meaning.174  This narrow understanding, and focus on 
literal meaning in avoidance canon cases, has caused the Court to assert 
 
 169 Because they are an aspect of the normal functioning of language, the possibility of implied 
meanings should be amenable to textualists, as well as intentionalists.  Manning argues that 
textualism maintains that “texts should be taken at face value—with no implied extensions 
of specific texts or exceptions to general ones—even if the legislation will then have an 
awkward relationship to the apparent background intention or purpose that produced it.”  
John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 424–25 (2005).  Such 
a view is normative in nature, rather than a description of how language functions.  Manning 
defends the no-exceptions view as necessary to preserve the “bargain” struck by legislators 
in enacting the statute, see id. at 431, but this view fails to recognize that implied restrictions 
are sometimes necessary in order to preserve that bargain. 
 170 See Manning, supra note 16, at 2392–93 (indicating that textualists “ask how a reasonable 
person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in 
context”). 
 171 See SLOCUM, supra note 61, at 76–79 (describing how both intentionalists rely on conventions 
of meaning and hypothetical notions of legislative intent). 
 172 Sbisà, supra note 160, at 325. 
 173 See Manning, supra note 149 (explaining the textualist position that semantic evidence 
should be privileged over pragmatic evidence). 
 174 See Part IV.A. (defining “communicative meaning”). 
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an important distinction between ambiguity and implied terms.175  
Recall the Court’s assertion that clear statement rules may “impl[y] . . . 
limit[ations] on . . . otherwise unambiguous [text],” but the avoidance 
canon serves only to resolve linguistic ambiguity.176  The Court’s 
understanding of implied terms as being extraordinary aspects of legal 
interpretation is unfortunate considering that the meaning 
communicated by both legal and non-legal utterances often includes 
propositions that are unarticulated (i.e., implied).177  So-called 
unarticulated constituents are not expressed in the explicit form of a 
sentence but nevertheless must be interpreted in order to grasp the 
correct meaning of that sentence.178  Recognizing that some of the 
meaning of a communication may be implied is a routine aspect of 
language comprehension.  Context may always reveal that a given 
communication cannot be understood accurately without some 
unarticulated constituent being part of its meaning.179  The notion of 
unarticulated constituents is thus dependent on the interpreter making 
use of relevant contextual information, and in that sense is consistent 
with the evidence showing how interpreters help make communication 
more efficient by routinely using contextual evidence to disambiguate 
language.180 
Despite the Court’s view of implied meanings in some avoidance 
canon cases, courts frequently restrict the literal meanings of statutes 
on the basis of implicit understandings, as the normal functioning of 
language dictates should happen.  In fact, statutes often contain implicit 
restrictions that are so obvious and accepted that they would not be the 
 
 175 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–09 and accompanying text (referring 
primarily to Martinez and Zadvydas to show the distinctions between rules for resolving 
textual ambiguity and implied limitations on otherwise ambiguous text, despite Zadvydas’s 
notably generous application). 
 176 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 141 (2005). 
 177 See SLOCUM, supra note 61, at 153–72 (discussing the quantifier domain restriction and 
ordinary meaning). 
 178 An unarticulated constituent is part of the intuitive meaning of the utterance yet does not 
correspond to anything in the sentence itself.  For a comprehensive account of unarticulated 
constituents, see RECANATI, supra note 17. 
 179 See generally Kent Bach, Semantic, Pragmatic, in MEANING AND TRUTH 1, 1–2 (J. Keim Campbell, 
M. O’Rourke, & D. Shier eds., 2002) (explaining the prevalence of unarticulated constituents). 
 180 See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text (explaining and justifying the claim that the 
communicative meaning of a provision may be clear even when linguistic ambiguity is also 
present). 
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source of litigation.181  These implied limitations on texts can derive 
from linguistic features that also exist outside of legal contexts as well 
as those that are mostly found in legal contexts.182  In both situations, 
implied meanings often involve interpretive principles that are 
triggered by explicit and relatively specific linguistic phenomena (such 
as the existence of certain words or types of words).183  In contrast, 
substantive canons are not triggered by any specific linguistic 
formula.184  Instead, any substantive canon is triggered by a combination 
of the potential consequences of a particular interpretation (such as an 
interpretation that would raise a serious constitutional issue) and the 
absence of sufficiently clear textual language supporting that 
interpretation.185 It is therefore not possible to legitimize a substantive 
canon through its connection to the linguistic meaning of some explicit 
term in a given provision.  Rather, in order to situate substantive canons 
as aspects of the communicative meaning of a provision, there must be 
some understanding of implied meanings and their connection to 
communicative meaning.  The concept of presupposition provides such 
a mechanism for determining whether a substantive canon can be 
viewed, at least as a general matter, as a part of the communicative 
meaning of a provision. 
 
 181 See SLOCUM, supra note 61, at 158–67 (discussing how so-called universal quantifiers, which 
are aspects of both ordinary speech and legal texts, typically contain implied restrictions, 
inferred on the basis of contextual evidence, which are sometimes obvious and sometimes 
contestable). 
 182 See id. (regarding descriptive semantics of qualifier domain restrictions).  The textual canon 
ejusdem generis is an example of a legal interpretive principle, though consistent with 
linguistic principles, which provides for implied restrictions on broad textual language.  See 
id. at 186–202 (discussing the ejusdem generis canon). 
 183 See supra note 181 (referring to universal quantifiers). 
 184 In contrast, the ejusdem generis canon is triggered by a catch-all phrase and quantifier 
domain restriction is triggered by a quantifier (usually a universal quantifier).  See supra note 
24 (describing how the ejusdem generis canon is triggered); supra note 181 (describing 
universal quantifiers). 
 185 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (explaining substantive canons’ functions, 
elements and examples that speak to their strength of force). 
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C.  The Linguistic Principle of Presupposition and Literal Meaning 
1. A Description of Presupposition 
Presuppositions are ubiquitous in language and are part of the 
context in which a communication occurs.186  A presupposition denotes 
a background belief the truth of which is taken for granted.  In more 
formal terms, A presupposes a statement B if B is a precondition of the 
truth or falsity of A.187  Thus, to take a simple and obvious example, if 
someone says that “Gavin’s bicycle is grey,” the speaker could be said to 
convey at least two propositions.188  The first is that ‘Gavin has a bicycle,’ 
and the second is that ‘the bicycle is grey.’189  The second proposition is 
‘asserted,’ but the first is ‘presupposed.’190  The presupposition, ‘Gavin 
has a bicycle,’ must be supposed to be true in order for the proposition, 
‘Gavin’s bicycle is grey,’ to be judged true or false.191 
The truth of the presupposition must be taken for granted by the 
producer of an utterance and must be known and taken account of by 
the interpreter for the utterance to be considered appropriate in 
context.192  The inquiry can be objectified in the sense that it can be said 
that x presupposes y if, “normally speaking, a speaker who uttered x 
would thereby commit himself to the presupposition that y is true.”193  
Thus, a presupposition can arise from “general properties of the context 
and the expectations of the discourse participants.”194  The “common 
ground” between speaker and participants therefore plays a crucial role 
in assessing the validity of a presupposition.195  Acceptance of the 
presupposition is “‘mutual’ in the following sense: if x is in the common 
ground, then: 
 
 186 See E.J. KRAHMER, PRESUPPOSITION AND ANAPHORA 3 (1998); ALAN CRUSE, A GLOSSARY OF 
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS 139 (2006) (explaining that presuppositions are a ubiquitous 
aspect of language). 
 187 See KRAHMER, supra note 186, at 139. 
 188 See id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 135, at 127–28. 
 192 See CRUSE, supra note 186, at 138; see also Sbisà, supra note 160, at 325 (explaining that if 
the interpreter does not share the speaker’s presuppositions, the interpreter might 
misunderstand her). 
 193 See Bart Geurts, Presupposition and Givenness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 3 
(Yan Huang ed., 2017). 
 194 Christopher Potts, Presupposition and Implicature, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
SEMANTIC THEORY 169 (Shalom Lappin & Chris Fox eds., 2015). 
 195 See Geurts, supra note 193, at 4. 
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(a) all participants accept x; 
(b) all participants accept (a); 
(c) all participants accept (b); 
and so on.196 
By using an expression that triggers the presupposition that x, the 
speaker signals (or acknowledges) that x is already part of the common 
ground.197 
2. An Example of Presupposition: The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers 
Presuppositions easily fit within the concept of communicative 
meaning.198  Yet, due to the uncertainty of implied meanings in legal 
interpretation, debates about which presuppositions courts should 
recognize have long been an aspect of interpretive disputes.199  One 
example of implied terms based on presuppositions involves common 
law exceptions to statutory provisions that do not otherwise provide for 
them.  A classic discussion of these unarticulated constituents can be 
found in Lon Fuller’s famous law review article, “The Case of the 
Speluncean Explorers.”200  In the article, Fuller presents a scenario 
where five men are trapped in a cave while hiking.201  Eventually, the 
group decides that in order to avoid death by starvation one of the men 
would have to be eaten by the others.202  The group casts lots to 
determine which member to sacrifice.203  After putting to death and 
eating one of the group members, the four remaining members are 
rescued and charged with murder.204  The criminal provision at issue, N. 
C. S. A. (n. s.) § 12- A, provides simply that: 
 
 196 Id. n.1. 
 197 See id. at 5. 
 198 See supra Part IV.A. (defining communicative meaning). 
 199 Of course, judges rarely, if ever, use the term “presupposition” when discussing an 
interpretive dispute that involves the possible recognition of a presupposition.  Instead, the 
Court uses the term “presumption” to mean, roughly, the same thing.  See infra notes 212–21 
and accompanying text. 
 200 See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
 201 Id. at 616. 
 202 Id. at 618. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 618–19. 
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“Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by 
death.”205 
Although succinct, the provision is misleadingly clear to those not 
knowledgeable about the legal system, considering the difficulties that 
the (fictional) individual justices had in deciding the meaning of it.206 
Fuller’s article, which contained five opinions from the justices of the 
fictional Supreme Court of Newgarth, illustrates the debate about literal 
meaning versus implied terms.207  Specifically, one question was 
whether common law defenses to criminal charges were still available 
notwithstanding the unlimited scope (at least with respect to defenses) 
of the criminal provision.208  Under one theory of the case, the 
defendants needed the benefit of a necessity defense in order to avoid 
conviction.209  Although there was no majority of justices willing to 
recognize a necessity defense, Chief Justice Foster commented that self-
defense was a recognized defense to § 12- A, even though there is 
nothing in the wording of the statute that suggested the exception.210  
The literal meaning of § 12- A therefore exceeded in scope the legal 
meaning of the provision, which had its domain limited by the 
availability of at least one implicit defense. 
3. Presuppositions and Substantive Canons 
The concept of presupposition thus provides a theory of how an 
implied term, motivated by legal concerns, may nevertheless be an 
aspect of the communicative meaning of a provision.211  Presupposition 
can also explain the Court’s decision in Bond, and in fact is the theory 
that the Court used to justify its implied restriction on the scope of the 
statute.212  Recall that in limiting the reach of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act of 1998 the Court cited the “ambiguity” 
 
 205 Id. at 619. 
 206 The court ended up deadlocked, with one justice withdrawing from the case.  See id. at 645. 
 207 See id. at 624–26. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 625. 
 210 Id. at 624. 
 211 For example, in the case of the Speluncean Explorers, the theory would be that the legislature 
accepts when drafting the criminal provision that courts will accept that the legislature 
anticipates that the usual criminal defenses should apply, even though the criminal provision 
is not explicit in that respect.  For more recent analyses of the issues raised by the Speluncean 
Explorers hypothetical see Naomi R. Cahn et al., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: 
Contemporary Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1754 (1993). 
 212 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014). 
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of the definition of “chemical weapon,” which was based on its 
“improbably broad reach.”213  The Court also framed its holding as 
though it relied on a presupposition, explaining that, “[p]art of a fair 
reading of statutory text is recognizing that ‘Congress legislates against 
the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed presumptions.”214  Thus, the Court 
explained that it presumes “that a criminal statute derived from the 
common law carries with it the requirement of a culpable mental state—
even if no such limitation appears in the text—unless it is clear that the 
Legislature intended to impose strict liability.”215 Similarly, in the 
Court’s view, Congress is clear when it overrides the “usual 
constitutional balance of federal and state powers.”216  Thus, the Court 
sought a “clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local 
crimes,” which would rebut the presupposition that Congress is clear 
when it wishes to “intrude[] on the police power of the States.”217  By 
relying on a presupposition, the Court had no need to also declare the 
provision to be ambiguous, although the declaration of ambiguity may 
have been a reflexive move designed to undermine claims of judicial 
activism.218 
As the Speluncean Explorers and Bond examples illustrate, a statute 
may contain an implied provision that restricts its scope, even if the 
implied provision is not triggered by any explicit term in the provision.  
If accepted, the presupposition is part of the communicative meaning of 
the text.  When applied to substantive canons, the principle of 
presupposition therefore provides a way of resolving the dilemma of 
how an interpretive principle can both be tied to legislative intent 
(through the concept of communicative meaning) and provide a term 
that cannot be found in the explicit language of the provision.  Consider 
a clear statement rule, the presumption against retroactivity, which 
directs courts to give statutes only prospective effect unless the statute 
 
 213 Id. at 859–60. 
 214 Id. at 857 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).  As Justice 
Frankfurter put it in his famous article on statutory interpretation, correctly reading a statute 
“demands awareness of certain presuppositions.”  Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947). 
 215 Bond, 572 U.S. at 857 (citation omitted). 
 216 Id. at 858 (citation omitted). 
 217 Id. 
 218 See supra Part II.A. (explaining that courts are often motivated to find ambiguity in order to 
give themselves interpretive flexibility). 
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clearly provides that it should have retroactive effect.219  The 
presumption against retroactivity may be premised on the idea that 
members of Congress rarely intend to establish new substantive rules 
for past conduct.220  In fact, the Court has asserted that “[b]ecause it 
accords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily 
operate, a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with 
legislative and public expectations.”221  The presumption against 
retroactivity is therefore a demanding canon to overcome and requires 
statutory language that is “so clear that it could sustain only one 
interpretation” before statutes will be given retroactive effect.222  Thus, 
in such cases, the presupposition would be something like, when a 
statute does not expressly provide for retroactive application, Congress 
intends for the statute to have prospective only application.223  In more 
formal terms, the conclusion, A, that the statute at issue applies only 
prospectively, even though there is no explicit limit on the statute’s 
application, presupposes the presupposition, B, that Congress expressly 
provides for retroactive application.  Consequently, a statutory 
provision containing broad, general language should be interpreted in 
light of the presupposition that Congress is explicit when it intends for 
a statute to be applied retroactively. 
The above analysis can be extended to other substantive canons, 
including the avoidance canon.  The Court generally legitimizes 
substantive canons on the basis that their application will result in a 
statutory interpretation that reflects congressional intent, even though 
 
 219 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 267–68 (1994) (stating that “statutory 
retroactivity has long been disfavored” and is accompanied by “a requirement that Congress 
first make its intention clear” to find retrospective relief). 
 220 Nelson, supra note 78, at 390.  Congressional enactments that operate retroactively do not 
necessarily violate the Constitution.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325 n.55 (2001) (“[O]ur 
decision today is fully consistent with a recognition of Congress’ power to act retrospectively. 
We simply assert, as we have consistently done in the past, that in legislating retroactively, 
Congress must make its intention plain.”). 
 221 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272.  See also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and 
Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L. J. 291, 348–49 (2003) (noting that the 
Court’s motivation for the presumption against retroactivity is the unfairness involved in 
retroactive legislation and concern for the rule of law). 
 222 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316–17 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328, n.4 (1997)). 
 223 In St. Cyr, the Court held that provisions in immigration statutes that repealed discretionary 
relief from deportation did not apply retroactively because the provisions lacked a “clearly 
expressed statement of congressional intent” that they be applied retroactively.  Id. at 314.  
Although the statute must be “clear,” the Court has stated that the canon does not require that 
the statute contain an “express provision about temporal reach” for it to have retroactive 
potential.  Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 40 (2006). 
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substantive canons are designed to vindicate normative concerns 
specific to the law.224  Thus, in the Court’s view, the avoidance canon 
represents a “reasonable presumption” that Congress “did not intend 
the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts” and is thus 
“a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.”225  
Similarly, the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal 
statutes reflects the “commonsense notion that Congress generally 
legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”226 
The concept of presupposition can therefore provide the link 
between substantive canons and legislative intent either because each 
substantive canon’s presupposition generally represents congressional 
preferences or because “[i]t is presumable that Congress legislates with 
knowledge of [the Court’s] basic rules of statutory construction[.]”227  
Thus, courts and Congress are part of an interpretive community 
engaged in a dialogue where Congress understands the basic 
interpretive principles that will be applied by courts.228  In essence, then, 
like the Speluncean Explorers hypothetical, a legislature may assume it 
can enact unqualified provisions and courts will restrict the domains of 
these provisions based on established presuppositions, thereby making 
the drafting process more efficient.229  Indeed, the Court has maintained 
that using substantive canons to create limitations on broad statutory 
language “is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional 
intent may be ascertained.”230  As Justice Scalia has explained with 
 
 224 See supra notes 71–71 and accompanying text (describing the normative basis of substantive 
canons). 
 225 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 368, 381–82 (2005). 
 226 Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388 (2005) (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 
204, n.5 (1993)).  Small continues and states that the Court has “adopt[ed] the legal 
presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not 
extraterritorial, application.”  Id. at 388–89 (citation omitted).  Other substantive canons are 
similarly based on generalizations about congressional intent.  For instance, the canon 
benefiting Native Americans “assumes Congress intends its statutes to benefit the tribes[.]” 
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 82, 95 (2001). 
 227 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991). 
 228 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) 
(explaining that textualists “argue that a faithful agent’s job is to decode legislative 
instructions according to the common social and linguistic conventions shared by the 
relevant community”). 
 229 In a similar way, it is often more efficient to use ambiguous language, knowing that the 
circumstances will enable the listener to effectively disambiguate.  See supra notes 123–26 
and accompanying text. 
 230 Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
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regard to the clear statement rule against waiver of state sovereign 
immunity, “since congressional elimination of state sovereign immunity 
is such an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be 
explicitly decreed [by Congress] rather than offhandedly implied—so 
something like a ‘clear statement’ rule is merely normal 
interpretation.”231 
D.  The Fictions of Presuppositions and Substantive Canons 
Despite the Court’s assertions about the connection between 
substantive canons and legislative intent, any description of how 
presuppositions work in legal interpretation is necessarily based on a 
view of the legislative process that, at least to some degree, is fictional.  
Presuppositions are justified if the speaker accepts all of the information 
in the common ground as normally being true and understands that all 
of the participants accept the information as true.232  Yet, in legal 
interpretation presuppositions associated with substantive canons are, 
in essence, attributed by the interpreter (judges) to the speaker 
(Congress) on the basis of concerns articulated by the interpreter rather 
than the speaker.  After all, Congress has not created any of the 
substantive canons, and indications of congressional acquiescence 
generally do not come from explicit congressional approval.  A given 
presupposition might therefore be fictitious because Congress does not 
have the canon in mind when drafting legislation, or because Congress 
attempts but is unable to comply with the clarity required by the 
canon.233 
The ideal scenario may be one where the judiciary’s presuppositions 
become the legislature’s presuppositions, but while substantive canons 
reflect the priorities of the judiciary, they may not necessarily reflect 
those of Congress.  Still, nonconformity of substantive canons with 
congressional preferences might depend on the generality at which the 
intent issue is framed.  For instance, when the avoidance canon is 
viewed in a highly generalized sense that cuts across all categories of 
cases as well as time, it may be consistent with legislative preferences in 
 
 231 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29 (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1997). 
 232 See supra notes 185–98 and accompanying text. 
 233 Thus, Congress may generally have a substantive canon in mind when drafting legislation but 
may be unable to draft the legislation in a way that will convince the reviewing court that the 
clarity requirement of the canon has been satisfied. 
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the sense that Congress desires that statutory indeterminacy be 
resolved in a manner consistent with “fundamental national 
principles.”234 On the other hand, at a lower level of generality, it may be 
that the avoidance canon is often applied in a manner designed to elicit 
a legislative reaction to the judicial decision.235  This would especially be 
true when the avoidance canon is applied to statutes that burden 
discrete and insular minorities.236  Similarly, the avoidance canon might 
be applied in order to force legislative deliberation to make up for 
underenforced constitutional norms, such as the nondelegation 
doctrine.237 
If Congress had substantive canons in mind when drafting 
legislation, it would arguably be insignificant (as far as presupposition 
is concerned) if Congress did not embrace the normative concerns 
underlying the canons.  The interpretive community model, though, is a 
broad generalization that can accurately describe only some of the 
interaction between courts and Congress.  The drafters of legislation are 
often unaware of substantive canons, or are only aware of them in a very 
general sense, and may not always carefully consult them when drafting 
legislation.238  Even if Congress considered substantive canons when 
drafting legislation, in some cases it is difficult or impossible to predict 
 
 234 See Elhauge, supra note 655, at 2256; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 948 (2013) (reporting that a survey 
of congressional staffers showed that “[f]orty-four percent of [the] respondents reported a 
judicial presumption in favor of upholding federal statutes”). 
 235 See Elhauge, supra note 655, at 2166 (explaining that substantive canons like the rule of 
lenity may be counter to the desires of the legislature); see also Ernest A. Young, 
Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. 
L. REV. 1549, 1580 (2000) (citation omitted) (“[T]he avoidance canon actually makes a 
difference only in those cases where the best evidence of Congress’s intent apart from the 
canon points toward the broader, more constitutionally problematic construction.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 236 See Elhauge, supra note 655, at 2210 (arguing that using the avoidance canon to “interpret 
ambiguous legislation not to burden [discrete and insular minorities] where legislative 
preferences are unclear usefully results in more precise legislation”). 
 237 See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111–
13 (1990); see also Elhauge, supra note 657, at 2256 (noting that the avoidance canon is used 
to avoid conflict with the legislative branch and preserve the Court’s political capital to 
enforce constitutional judgments). 
 238 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 234, at 902 (finding that there are some canons drafters 
know and use, while there are others that many drafters either reject or do not know).  See 
generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) (concluding that traditional judicial 
understandings of the legislative process are inaccurate);. 
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how courts will apply the canons.239  Reviewing judges may disagree 
with the existence of a canon on normative grounds and may thus wish 
to avoid its application or, conversely, may strongly agree with the 
canon and be motivated to apply it even when the linguistic and other 
evidence seems clear.240  Nevertheless, predicting likely application is 
easier for same canons than for others.  The strongest clear statement 
rules set forth relatively determinate conventions.  For example, “magic 
words” (i.e., specific language) may be required before a court will 
interpret a statute as divesting courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction.241  
In contrast, the avoidance canon is triggered by ambiguity (according to 
the Court), but it is difficult to predict whether a reviewing court will 
find statutory language to be ambiguous.242  In addition, it is not always 
possible to anticipate the constitutional issues that may be raised by the 
application of a statute.  In some cases, it may be virtually impossible 
because the law may change and create constitutional issues that were 
not present at the time of the statute’s enactment.243 
The idea that the concept of presupposition can situate the 
avoidance canon as an aspect of the communicative meaning of a statute 
may thus seem problematic because such a theory relies on contestable, 
and perhaps fictitious, inferences about congressional intent.  Fictions, 
though, are an ineliminable aspect of the interpretive process generally.  
Selecting an interpretation of a statute involves a multi-step process of 
inferential reasoning that includes decisions about how the evidence 
from different sources of meaning should be combined and which 
evidence to privilege when there is a conflict.244  In fact, a multi-step 
 
 239 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 520–21 (1989) (describing the “battles” involved in determining “[h]ow clear is 
clear” in the application of one substantive canon). 
 240 See generally Torben Spaak, Relativism in Legal Thinking: Stanley Fish and the Concept of an 
Interpretive Community, 21 RATIO JURIS 157 (2008) (describing problems inherent in the idea 
of interpretive communities). 
 241 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 327 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court had established “a superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement 
for the congressional expression of” an intent to preclude habeas review).  The absence of 
“magic words” may thus justify a court in concluding that a provision does not strip courts of 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, even if there is no evidence that the legislature considered the 
issue. 
 242 See supra Part II.B (describing the subjectivity inherent in the ambiguity determination). 
 243 See generally William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. 
L. REV. 1583 (2020) (discussing the problems that arise when the law changes between the 
time of statutory enactment and when a substantive canon is to be applied). 
 244 See Allott & Shaer, supra note 147, at 196–98 (explaining the inferential nature of legal 
interpretation and the need to balance various possible sources of meaning). 
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process of inferential reasoning is associated with any given 
interpretive principle, even when considered in isolation.  Furthermore, 
all of these processes of inferential reasoning are contestable in various 
ways.  Consider the ordinary meaning doctrine, which represents the 
judicial commitment to interpret words in legal texts in accordance with 
accepted and typical standards of communication that apply outside of 
the law.245  The doctrine acts as an umbrella of sorts that encompasses 
various interpretive principles and sources of meaning.  Dictionaries are 
an obvious, and commonly used, example, even though commentators 
have harshly criticized judicial reliance on dictionaries.246  A dictionary 
definition is not useful because it reveals some particular legislative 
intent but, rather, because of the (often mistaken) belief that the 
definition provides the ordinary meaning of the relevant word and the 
correlative, generalized presumption that the legislature intended for 
the word to be given its ordinary meaning.247 
Legal interpretation thus includes both fictional principles as well as 
the sort of presuppositions and implied meanings that are an aspect of 
interpretation generally.  Some of the presuppositions and implied 
meanings, like other interpretive principles, may be based at least partly 
on fictions, or at least a lack of knowledge about legislative 
preferences.248  The presupposition underlying the avoidance canon is 
something like, Congress clearly indicates its intent for a statute to apply 
to a situation that raises a serious constitutional question, but the 
presupposition is contestable.249  More importantly, a rejection of the 
avoidance canon’s presupposition as an unacceptable fiction would not 
undermine the reality that some aspects of meaning are implied and the 
Court’s focus on literal meaning instead of communicative meaning is 
misplaced.  Furthermore, the avoidance canon’s presupposition offers a 
 
 245 See generally BERNARD S. JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN LAW: LINGUISTIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SEMIOTIC 
PERSPECTIVES (1995) (explaining how to make sense of the law, and concluding that it is not 
through traditional legal analysis). 
 246 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (describing the unprincipled use of dictionaries by the Supreme 
Court). 
 247 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (explaining that the Court 
“assume[s] that ‘the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words 
used.’” (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))). 
 248 See generally Elhauge, supra notes 655, 67 (categorizing interpretive principles on the basis 
of whether they are consistent with likely legislative preferences). 
 249 See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text (explaining the level of clarity required by 
the avoidance canon). 
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theory of how the avoidance canon fits into the structure of 
interpretation as an aspect of the communicative meaning of a text, but 
the structural element is separate from the triggering element.250  Thus, 
indeterminacy, properly understood, can still act as the trigger for the 
avoidance canon even if presupposition is rejected as the structural 
element of the avoidance canon. 
E.   Substantive Canons, Presuppositions, and Implied Terms 
If the concept of presupposition is the theory that best explains and 
situates the avoidance canon within the structure of interpretation, it 
has equal relevance to clear statement rules.  Similar to the avoidance 
canon, clear statement rules are triggered by a judicially perceived lack 
of linguistic clarity, rather than by a particular word or phrase.251  The 
process of inferential reasoning is also similar for the avoidance canon 
and clear statement rules.  Compare a paradigmatic clear statement rule, 
the presumption against retroactivity, with the avoidance canon.  The 
presupposition supporting the presumption against retroactivity is that 
Congress is clear when it desires that a statute should have retroactive 
effects, and the presupposition supporting the avoidance canon is that 
Congress is clear when it is legislating in sensitive areas that raise 
serious constitutional questions.252  The respective presuppositions are 
general ones that cut across time and subject matter, and legislative 
intent typically cannot be traced to the statute at issue in the sense that 
specific evidence can be uncovered that Congress desired that the 
statute be interpreted in light of the presupposition.253  Furthermore, in 
both situations statutory language may be general in nature and, by its 
terms, seem to apply both prospectively and retroactively or cover the 
constitutionally sensitive issue. 
Although the Court has asserted a distinction between the avoidance 
canon and clear statement rules, the Court has not offered a theory of 
how clear statement rules can recognize implied exceptions to broad 
 
 250 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction between the 
structural and triggering aspects of interpretive principles). 
 251 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text (describing clear statement rules). 
 252 See supra notes 223, 250 and accompanying text (describing the presuppositions underlying 
the presumption against retroactivity and the avoidance canon). 
 253 That is, it is unlikely that in many cases members of Congress would have discussed the 
potential judicial application of a substantive canon during the legislative process.  See infra 
notes 270–73. 
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statutory language but the avoidance canon cannot.254  For example, the 
Court has not explained how any differences in treatment are traceable 
to congressional intent.255  The Court’s failure to provide a rationale for 
the disparate treatment is not surprising.  There is no reason to believe 
that somehow by their very nature clear statement rules create implied 
limitations while the avoidance canon is limited to resolving explicit 
linguistic ambiguity, particularly considering the wide variety of 
implied meanings that exist in both legal and non-legal 
communication.256 
Even if the various substantive canons fit into the structure of 
interpretation in similar ways based on the concept of presupposition, 
it is still possible to sort the canons based on their underlying 
presuppositions.  The distinctions relate to how easily the respective 
presuppositions can be cancelled.  Presuppositions in general are not 
cancelled by grammatical means but, instead, by extragrammatical 
evidence, including the specific context of the communication and its 
goals, as well as “our general knowledge store.”257  As such, 
presupposition interpretation is an extragrammatical phenomenon.258  
With substantive canons, the ease with which a presupposition is 
cancelled should naturally vary based on the specificity of the 
presupposition.259  For instance, recall that the presupposition 
 
 254 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.–08 and accompanying text (describing the 
Court’s distinction between the avoidance canon and clear statement rules). 
 255 For example, in theory there could be evidence that Congress may, as a general matter, desire 
that the avoidance canon be limited to resolving linguistic ambiguity but clear statement 
rules be allowed to create implied limitations. 
 256 It is possible that the difference in treatment may be based on the normative basis for the 
canons.  Perhaps clear statement rules are supported by more powerful normative 
justifications, thus dictating a more powerful role in statutory interpretations.  See Richard 
M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497, 1497 (2019) (arguing that “the meaning of 
legal clarity in any given doctrinal context should turn on the purposes of the relevant 
doctrine”).  The Court has not, however, articulated such a view or explained how a more 
compelling normative basis should result in a higher level of clarity required to overcome a 
canon. 
 257 See ARIEL, supra note 137, at 41 (“[P]resuppositions are here ‘canceled’ not by grammatical 
means, but rather, by extragrammatical factors (referring to the specific context, the goals of 
the communication, and our general knowledge store), our pragmatics, in other words.”). 
 258 See id. 
 259 Recall that the strength of a substantive canon involves both the standard that must be met 
to overcome the meaning the canon directs courts to select and the determinants of meaning 
that may be considered when evaluating whether the burden has been met.  See supra note 
75 and accompanying text.  Thus, a clear statement rule might be stronger than another 
substantive canon based on a greater degree of clarity required and fewer interpretive 
sources, such as legislative history, that can be used to meet that standard. 
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underlying the presumption against retroactivity is something like, 
when a statute does not expressly provide for retroactive application, 
Congress intends for the statute to have prospective only application.260  
In such a situation, extraordinarily strong evidence would be required 
to establish that Congress expressed an intent that the provision apply 
retroactively, even if Congress did not make its intent explicit in the text 
of the provision.  In fact, it may be that the presupposition cannot be 
cancelled, but rather only fulfilled or not by the explicit statutory text.261  
Recall, in contrast, that the presupposition underlying the avoidance 
canon is more general, providing that Congress clearly indicates its 
intent for a statute to apply to a situation that raises a serious 
constitutional question.262  For the avoidance canon, the presupposition 
may be more easily cancelled, such as through a combination of broad 
statutory language and a legislative scheme that is incompatible with an 
implied limitation.263 
The picture that emerges is that the various presuppositions 
underlying substantive canons are generalized across time and subject 
matter, and thus are not always tied to legislative expectations at the 
time of enactment of a statute.  Nevertheless, the concept of 
presupposition illustrates that, contrary to the Court’s assertions, 
implied meanings are compatible with the avoidance canon in the same 
way they are compatible with clear statement rules.264  Even so, the 
Court’s view that clear statement rules are more interpretively 
significant than the avoidance canon is consistent with the 
presuppositions associated with the various canons.  Thus, without 
 
 260 See supra note 221–25 and accompanying text (explaining the level of clarity required by the 
presumption against retroactivity). 
 261 Thus, the presupposition holds but may be satisfied by the kind of explicit evidence required 
by the Court. 
 262 See supra notes 117–20, 225 and accompanying text (explaining the level of clarity required 
by the avoidance canon). 
 263 Thus, the avoidance canon’s presupposition may be cancelled through sufficient evidence 
indicating congressional intent that the statute cover constitutionally problematic scenarios 
even though the language of the statute does not clearly mandate such applications.  Cf. 
Mandy Simons, On the Conversational Basis of Some Presuppositions, in 2 PERSPECTIVES IN 
PRAGMATICS, PHILOSOPHY & PSYCHOLOGY, PERSPECTIVES ON LINGUISTIC PRAGMATICS, 329, 331 
(Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza eds., 2013) (explaining that 
presuppositions are susceptible to cancellation in “explicit ignorance contexts” where “it is 
apparent to the addressee that the speaker is ignorant with respect to the proposition that 
would normally be presupposed”). 
 264 See supra Part IV.C.1.  Considering these generally applicable interpretive principles, the 
Court’s assertion that the role of some canons is to resolve ambiguity while other canons 
allow for the recognition of implied terms is, at the least, undertheorized. 
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relying on the ambiguity doctrine, distinctions can be made regarding 
the degree of indeterminacy required to trigger substantive canons.  The 
strength of the presupposition will depend on how precisely it should 
be framed, and thus the evidence required to overcome it.  This will 
naturally make the presuppositions underlying clear statement rules 
stronger than the necessarily general presupposition underlying the 
avoidance canon. 
 
IV.  THE NEW CANON OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: A DEMONSTRATION 
The trigger for the avoidance canon is left be clarified and connected 
to the concept of presupposition.  Connecting the avoidance canon to 
communicative meaning via a presupposition situates the avoidance 
canon within the structure of interpretation, but if the ambiguity 
concept is not the trigger for the avoidance canon, there must be some 
alternative understanding of the sort of clarity that would satisfy the 
avoidance canon’s presupposition.265  Courts can thus continue to insist 
that indeterminacy (the opposite of “clarity”) is the trigger for the 
avoidance canon.  Recall that the current ambiguity concept elides the 
different ways in which language can be indeterminate, and courts have 
therefore not considered how different types of indeterminacy might 
trigger the avoidance canon and interact with its presupposition.266  
Nevertheless, various types of indeterminacy should be uncontroversial 
as triggers for the avoidance canon, such as uncertainty about whether 
the semantic meaning of a term covers certain situations (as discussed 
below).267  If communicative meaning rather than literal meaning is the 
focus of interpretation, however, some kinds of indeterminacy are far 
more controversial. 
 
 265 In addition to a trigger for application, the new avoidance canon would involve an evidential 
question concerning the allowable determinants of meaning.  If communicative meaning is 
sought, allowable evidence would include contextually based inferences regarding the 
purpose of the communication as well as the consequences of selecting a particular 
interpretation.  See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing how substantive 
canons are scalable partly on the basis of the allowable determinants of meaning). 
 266 See Slocum, supra note 127, at 211–17 (describing some of the different forms of 
indeterminacy that are conflated within the ambiguity concept by courts). 
 267 The lexical meaning of a term might be indeterminate for various reasons, including 
polysemy (two or more related meanings) and vagueness (one meaning with uncertainties 
regarding its scope).  See infra notes 275–81, 292, 329, 343–49.  Neither situation, however, 
involves an indeterminacy that should be controversial as a trigger for the avoidance canon. 
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Consider the situation, raised by the Bond case, where a court must 
decide whether the broad language of a statute should be interpreted in 
accordance with its literal meaning.268  These scenarios are common 
because legal texts are often drafted with high levels of generality 
(sometimes alarmingly so).269  While generality can serve various 
legitimate functions, the enacting legislature is unlikely to have 
considered many of the interpretive issues that will arise when the 
statute must be applied to specific cases.270  Thus, for example, in 
Rodriguez, Justice Breyer argued that the broad statutory language, 
taken as “legislative silence,” “suggest[ed] not disapproval of bail, but a 
lack of consideration of the matter.”271  There are various reasons for 
this legislative neglect, such as inattention to detail or a desire not to 
upset legislative compromises, but a significant reason is the inability to 
foresee all of the factual scenarios that may fall under the statute.272  
Situations where there is a stark mismatch between broad statutory 
breath and much narrower statutory purpose, which creates situations 
where the provision’s literal meaning threatens to cover sensitive 
situations, can fairly be labeled as indeterminate if the communicative 
meaning of a statute is being determined.273  Still, as exemplified by 
Bond, the judicial choice between interpreting broad, general statutory 
language literally or in some way restricting its scope is a long-standing 
topic that depends on normative notions of the proper judicial function 
in matters of statutory interpretation.274 
This Article does not seek to resolve the normative issues involved 
in deciding whether Bond-like indeterminacy should trigger the 
avoidance canon.  Instead, this Part illustrates how the new avoidance 
canon should function by analyzing two familiar scenarios that (should) 
involve less controversial notions of indeterminacy.  The first involves 
 
 268 See supra notes 44–55 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s decision in Bond v. 
United States). 
 269 See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 234, at 997 (explaining that “lack of time,” the “complexity 
of the issue,” and the “need for consensus” are reasons why statutes are drafted with 
indeterminacy). 
 270 Cf. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 390 (2005) (explaining that interpretive assumptions 
“help[] us determine Congress’ intent where Congress likely did not consider the matter ”). 
 271 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 872 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 272 See id. (explaining that “legislative silence” is most likely caused by Congress’ inability to 
predict whether a certain outcome would occur). 
 273 See supra Part II.A. (describing how alarming generality can be viewed as indeterminacy). 
 274 Thus, not every recognized indeterminacy must count as an indeterminacy for every 
substantive canon, although courts should articulate coherent theories of why certain 
indeterminacies should not act as triggers for a given substantive canon. 
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the much more common than currently recognized situation where, 
unlike the Bond case, the statutory language is indeterminate in the 
sense that an inference is required to precisify the provision in order to 
decide the interpretive question.  The immigration detention cases offer 
examples of this situation.  The second scenario involves (quite 
common) situations of lexical meaning where the term at issue has a 
semantic meaning that may have some clear applications but also 
presents a range of applications where it is not clear whether the term 
applies.275  A court thus has discretion within the range of indeterminacy 
to select a meaning that avoids serious constitutional issues.  In both the 
first and second scenario, the role of the presupposition should be to 
help select a precisifying interpretation that does not conflict with the 
legislative scheme even though it might be a second-best resolution of 
the indeterminacy.276 
The framework illustrated in this Part may not increase the number 
of situations where a court selects a second-best statutory 
interpretation in order to avoid a serious constitutional question.  The 
new trigger for the avoidance canon, ‘indeterminacy,’ determined in 
light of the communicative meaning of the text, is based in part on an 
understanding that implied meanings are a normal aspect of 
interpretation.277  Yet, even when an implied meaning is at issue and a 
serious constitutional issue is raised, a judge should select a second-best 
interpretation only if it would not conflict with the legislative scheme.  
Furthermore, as illustrated below, implied meanings are often required 
to resolve interpretive disputes, even when the reviewing court 
pretends that the dispute can be resolved on the basis of literal 
meaning.278 Similarly, uncertainty about the semantic meaning of a 
word or phrase often exists even if a court pretends that the literal 
meaning is clear.  Thus, the framework, if adopted, may well reduce 
interpretive decisions that are based on a misidentification of the 
linguistic meaning of the text. 
 
 275 This sort of situation is commonly referred to as “vagueness,” although it more often involves 
the concept of “multi-dimensional polysemy.”  DAVID LANIUS, STRATEGIC INDETERMINACY IN THE 
LAW 21, 129 (Janet Ainsworth et al. eds., 2019). 
 276 Thus, there must be sufficient pragmatic uncertainty that would allow for an implied term 
without disrupting the legislative scheme designed by Congress. 
 277 See supra Part.III.A. (describing communicative meaning as a model for statutory 
interpretation). 
 278 In such a situation, the reviewing court may be selecting a second-best interpretation while 
maintaining that it is merely applying the clear linguistic meaning of the text. 
May 2021] CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 645 
A.  Implied Restrictions Triggered by Indeterminacy 
The Court’s assertion that the avoidance canon, unlike clear 
statement rules, cannot sanction implied meanings fails to recognize 
situations where implied language is required to make a provision 
determinate enough to resolve the interpretive dispute.279  Sometimes 
the Court will label a provision as “ambiguous” rather than declaring 
that its meaning is underdetermined, even though the two terms refer 
to different phenomena.280  As explained in more detail below, 
communicative underdeterminacy exists when an expression does not 
specify certain details.281  Underdeterminacy can result when a legal text 
is drafted with a high level of generality and a corresponding lack of 
legislative attention to the specific scenarios that could arguably fall 
within the scope of the statute.  Thus, in situations involving 
underdeterminacy, the provision’s meaning cannot be determined by 
linguistic meaning alone, or often by relying on extra-textual indications 
of legislative intent, leaving the meaning to be determined in other 
ways.282 
1. Zadvydas v. Davis and Implied Meanings 
The recent immigration detention cases provide excellent examples 
of the Court failing to identify underdeterminacy.  In those cases, the 
Court focused on the explicit meanings of the provisions instead of 
acknowledging that inferences were necessary to precisify the statutory 
language in order to resolve the interpretive disputes.  Recall, for 
example, that the issue in Zadvydas was whether the statutory language 
“may be detained beyond the removal period” authorized the Attorney 
General to detain indefinitely immigrants beyond the statutory removal 
period.283  The Court justified application of the avoidance canon on the 
basis of the “ambiguity” of the verb “may” in the statutory phrase “may 
be detained.”284  Although the Court’s reasoning was not explicit, 
 
 279 See supra notes 177–82 and accompanying text (describing situations where recognition of 
an implied term is appropriate (or required) without regard to the existence of a 
presupposition). 
 280 See infra notes 286–94 and accompanying text (describing underdeterminacy). 
 281 Qiao Zhang, Fuzziness – Vagueness – Generality – Ambiguity, 29 J. PRAGMATICS 13, 16 (1998). 
 282 ROBYN CARSTON, THOUGHTS AND UTTERANCES: THE PRAGMATICS OF EXPLICIT COMMUNICATION 20–21 
(2002). 
 283 See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 284 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). 
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presumably the Court was contrasting “may” with “shall,” which would 
mandate continued detention.285  In fact, the Court in Rodriguez 
distinguished the statute at issue in Zadvydas, § 1231(a)(6), from two 
provisions at issue in the case, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2), on the basis 
that § 1231(a)(6) uses the ambiguous “may,” while the other two 
provisions “unequivocally mandate that aliens falling within their scope 
‘shall’ be detained.”286  The Court itself in Zadvydas, though, seemed to 
be confused about whether the permissive “may” rendered the statute 
ambiguous, referencing the government’s argument that “the statute 
means what it literally says.”287  In fact, the problem with the Court’s 
focus is that neither a permissive (“may”) nor a mandatory (“shall”) 
authorization to detain addresses the temporal issue of when the 
authorization terminates, which was the indeterminacy that should 
have been the focus of the Court’s analysis.288 
The distinction between ambiguity and 
generality/underdeterminacy serves to help illustrate the flaws of the 
Court’s interpretations in Zadvydas and Rodriguez.  An expression is 
general if its meaning is a genus of more than one species.289  Thus, for 
example, the term “color” is general because it includes within its scope 
“red,” “green,” “blue,” etc.  The term “parent” is general because it 
includes within its scope “mother” and “father.”290  Generality can be 
viewed as a kind of underdeterminacy where the more general the 
expression is the less informative the utterance becomes (and vice 
versa).  Underdeterminacy “does not entail that there is no fact of the 
matter as regards the proposition expressed, but rather that it cannot 
be determined by linguistic meaning alone.”291  In contrast, 
 
 285 The Court’s example supporting its claim that “may” was ambiguous did not go to the “may” 
vs. “shall” distinction, however, leaving unclear how exactly the example was relevant to the 
ambiguity of “may.”  The example involved a statute providing that the Attorney General 
“may” retain terrorist immigrants in custody and “must review the detention determination 
every six months.”  Id.  Thus, perhaps the Court’s point was that the terrorist provision 
explicitly contemplated extended detention.  If so, the mandated review language still does 
not explicitly authorize indefinite detention. 
 286 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018). 
 287 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 
 288 Consider a father’s authorization to his child to go outside the house.  Regardless of whether 
the father said “you may go outside” or “you shall go outside,” the child would still not know 
when the authorization terminated. 
 289 See Gillon, supra note 126, at 394–95 (defining “generality” and noting that it is distinct from 
ambiguity). 
 290 Id. at 394. 
 291 See CARSTON, supra note 282, at 20–21. 
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underspecificity involves situations where it is undetermined which of 
several determinate meanings were intended.292  For example, one way 
of treating ambiguity is to assert that a term, such as “bank,” has a single 
lexical entry with an underspecified meaning because the word itself 
does not specify which of the typical meanings was intended (i.e., a river 
bank or a financial institution).293 
Significantly, with a legal text underdeterminacy requires 
nonlinguistic judicial judgment to precisify the textual language to 
satisfy the needs of the law.294  Some scenarios involving 
underdeterminacy might require only obvious inferences from context 
while others require greater judicial creativity.  For example, one can 
easily imagine scenarios when “color” or “parent” could be used when 
indeterminacy would not result because the context indicates a more 
specific meaning (if a more specific meaning is needed).  In contrast, the 
expression “some event will happen at some time” is general in the lack-
of-detail sense.  Both “some event” and “some time” are, for most 
purposes, insufficiently informative in a way that needs little 
elaboration.  The expression represents more than just a category with 
a “fuzzy” boundary.295  If required to provide guidance, the expression 
will require significant nonlanguage-based precisification. 
Instead of focusing on semantic ambiguity, the Court in Zadvydas, as 
well as Rodriguez, should have addressed underdeterminacy and the 
difficult issues involved with the temporal domains of sentences.  In 
both cases, the relevant provisions could be viewed as underdetermined 
regarding the authorized scope of detention.  Regarding Zadvydas, the 
relevant provision, § 1231(a)(6), contains a temporal prepositional 
 
 292 See Una Stojnić, Matthew Stone & Ernie Lepore, Distinguishing Ambiguity from 
Underspecificity, in PRAGMATICS, TRUTH AND UNDERSPECIFICATION: TOWARDS AN ATLAS OF MEANING 
149, 149–50 (Ken Turner & Laurence Horn eds., 2018) (explaining underspecificity). 
 293 Mixingmemory, Polysemy Is Like Homonomy, Only Different, SCIENCEBLOGS (Nov. 3, 2006), 
http://scienceblogs.com/mixingmemory/2006/11/03/polysemy-is-like-homonomy-only/ 
[https://perma.cc/RF9J-7CFQ].  Of course, sentential context often can help specify the 
correct meaning. 
 294 See PETER LUDLOW, LIVING WORDS: MEANING UNDERDETERMINATION AND THE DYNAMIC LEXICON 65 
(2014) (“[Words used by lawmakers are just as open-ended as words used in day-to-day 
conversation. . . . [T]he idea that the answer is to be found in the language of the [text] is, in 
many cases, absurd.”). 
 295 The term “fuzziness” is used in linguistics and philosophy of language to describe the 
boundaries of categories (such as “vehicle”) that are “ill-defined, rather than sharp.”  MURPHY 
& KOSKELA, supra note 135, at 72.  Commentators often describe fuzziness as a type of 
vagueness. 
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phrase, “may be detained beyond the removal period.”296  Temporal 
prepositions establish a temporal relationship between the complement 
and some other sentence element, such as the subject or another object.  
Temporal prepositions can be divided into the two subclasses of time 
position (e.g., noon) and duration.  The duration subclass addresses the 
question of how long.  To illustrate, even simple assertive sentences like 
“Mary kissed John” make an existential claim that an event of a certain 
type (i.e., Mary kissing John) occurred within some contextually 
determined interval.297  The Court in Zadvydas should thus have 
explored the possibility of an implied contextual restriction on the 
temporal domain of “beyond” which would have resolved the relevant 
underdeterminacy.  Instead, by focusing on the peripheral fact that 
“may” is permissive, the Court failed to persuasively identify uncertainty 
regarding the scope of the detention authority (which invited vigorous 
dissenting opinions) and provided a poor basis for the application of the 
avoidance canon.298 
The Court in Zadvydas should therefore have focused not on the 
ambiguity of any of the explicit terms in the provision (such as “may”) 
but, instead, on the underdeterminacy of the language.  The dissenting 
opinions in Zadvydas claimed that the majority rewrote the provision, 
but such a position fails to recognize the underdetermined language of 
the provision.299  Contrary to the government’s arguments in the case 
(and the Court’s acceptance of those arguments), the literal meaning of 
“beyond the removal period” is not forever or indefinitely.300  Rather, 
the provision is silent regarding the length of authorized detention.  
Fixing its authorized length involves judicial judgment of some sort, 
 
 296 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2012). 
 297 See Ian Pratt & Nissim Francez, Temporal Prepositions and Temporal Generalized 
Quantifiers, 24 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 187, 200 (2001).  Temporal preposition phrases (TPPs) 
include situations where explicit temporal indications are provided.  Thus, for example, in 
the sentence “Mary kissed John during every meeting” the existential quantification present 
in the sentence falls within the scope of the universal quantification (i.e., “every”) over 
meetings.  See id. 
 298 In an important sense, “may” gave the Attorney General more discretion, and hence more 
power, than “shall,” making the Court’s conclusion odd. 
 299 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 702 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the “Attorney 
General’s clear statutory authority to detain criminal aliens with no specified time limit”); id. 
at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court avoided a constitutional question “by 
interpreting a statute in obvious disregard of congressional intent; curing the resulting gap 
by writing a statutory amendment of its own”). 
 300 Or any other term meaning that there are no constraints on the government’s power to 
detain. 
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whether that judgment involves an inference about congressional intent 
based on the statutory scheme or something more normative in 
nature.301 
If the presupposition underlying the avoidance canon is that 
Congress clearly indicates its intent for a statute to apply to a situation 
that raises a serious constitutional question, the identification of 
linguistic underdeterminacy should give the reviewing court a 
considerable range of interpretive flexibility in precisifying the statute.  
In such cases of underdeterminacy, the interpretive question concerns 
the judicial construction of an implied provision, as occurred in 
Zadyvydas and other cases involving the avoidance canon.302  In some 
cases, the implied provision may have a more tenuous connection to 
likely legislative intent than do other possible implied provisions.303  In 
Zadvydas, for instance, the Court’s imposition of an implied six-month 
limit on detention was likely not the intended meaning of § 
1231(a)(6).304  The Court’s general holding, which itself was implied 
and motivated by serious constitutional concerns, was that “once 
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no 
longer authorized by statute.”305  In order to provide a more precise rule 
regarding the permissible length of detention, the Court pointed to a 
congressional statement found in legislative history from over forty 
years prior to the enactment of § 1231(a)(6) that doubted the 
constitutionality of detention for more than six months.306  That is thin 
evidence, however, on which to decide that the legislative intent was for 
§ 1231(a)(6) to include the (implicit) six-month restriction.  In 
 
 301 This is not to argue that the possible terms fixing the authorized length of detention are all 
equally persuasive but, rather, that there may be multiple permissible ways to set some 
limitation on the Attorney General’s power to detain. 
 302 See supra Part I.C. (describing the Zadvydas and Catholic Bishop cases). 
 303 This is especially true if intent is measured in terms of congressional intent regarding the 
meaning of the provision as opposed to a more general notion of the purpose of the provision 
or how Congress might have responded to an issue if it had been explicitly considered. 
 304 Indeed, one of the primary complaints of Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion (joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist) in Zadvydas was that the statute was 
clear and that “[a]n interpretation which defeats the stated congressional purpose does not 
suffice to invoke the constitutional doubt rule, for it is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 305 Id. at 699 (majority opinion). 
 306 See id. at 701 (“We do have reason to believe, however, that Congress previously doubted the 
constitutionality of detention for more than six months.” (citing Juris. Statement in United 
States v. Witkovich, O.T.1956, No. 295, pp. 8–9)). 
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imposing the more determinate restriction of six-months, rather than 
merely the general requirement of “significant likelihood of removal in 
the reasonably foreseeable future,”307 the Court had to go beyond the 
meaning communicated by the text.308  The Court admitted as much 
when it asserted that it was adopting the six-month limitation “for the 
sake of uniform administration in the federal courts.”309 
The Court’s interpretation in Zadvydas might have been second-best, 
but if the meaning of a statute is underdetermined, deciding whether a 
given implied meaning has a closer connection to likely legislative intent 
than do other possible implied meanings is normal interpretation that 
would occur regardless of the existence of a serious constitutional 
question.  Instead, the question should be whether the implied 
provision, that would both avoid the constitutional issue and make the 
provision sufficiently determinate, would undermine the legislative 
scheme.  Justice Kennedy argued in dissent in Zadvydas that there was 
no “ambiguity in the delegation of the detention power to the Attorney 
General,” but he also argued that the Court’s implied limitation 
“defeat[ed] the statutory purpose and design.”310  More specifically, 
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court’s implied limitation made “the 
statutory purpose to protect the community ineffective,”311 the Court’s 
interpretation would result in unintended benefits for classes of 
immigrants not before the Court,312 and the Court’s opinion would 
interfere with the Executive’s foreign affairs authority.313  Whether 
these arguments are persuasive cannot be addressed here (although the 
Court did not find them persuasive), but they illustrate what should be 
the next stage of avoidance canon argumentation once indeterminacy is 
identified. 
 
 307 Id. 
 308 See id. at 699 (examining legislative history to ascertain Congressional intent). 
 309 Id. at 701. 
 310 Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 311 See id. at 708 (“The authority to detain beyond the removal period is to protect the 
community, not to negotiate the aliens’ return.”). 
 312 See id. at 710–11 (arguing that contrary to the Court’s claims, its interpretation would apply 
to immigrants stopped at the border, which would be inconsistent with congressional intent). 
 313 See id. at 711 (“The Court rushes to substitute a judicial judgment for the Executive’s 
discretion and authority.”). 
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2. Recent Immigration Detention Cases and Implied Meanings 
Similar to Zadvydas, the Court in Nielsen v. Preap,314 and Jennings v. 
Rodriguez,315 maintained that the avoidance canon cannot be triggered 
in the absence of statutory “ambiguity.”316  Even Justice Breyer in dissent 
in Rodriguez indicated that a finding of linguistic ambiguity (in 
Rodriguez, the term “detain”) is necessary in order to authorize the 
Court to fashion an implied provision.317  Unlike Zadvydas, though, in 
neither Rodriguez318 nor Nielsen319 did the Court address whether its 
interpretation, which rejected any entitlement to bond hearings in 
various situations involving long-term detention, raised a serious 
constitutional question.  In Zadvydas, the Court first established that 
indefinite immigration detention would raise a serious constitutional 
issue before considering whether an alternative interpretation was 
plausible.320  By engaging instead in its normal process of statutory 
interpretation, the Court in Nielsen and Rodriguez negated the 
presupposition associated with the avoidance canon and any motivation 
for selecting a second-best interpretation (even if only slightly second-
best).  Thus, without any reference to the avoidance canon, the Court in 
Rodriguez framed the interpretive issue as whether there was a 
“statutory foundation” for a restriction on detention without a bail 
hearing,321 in the sense that the provisions may “plausibly be read to 
contain an implicit 6-month limit.”322  By framing the issue as whether 
Congress specifically intended for there to be an implicit provision 
regarding bail, rather than whether there is sufficient indeterminacy 
such that an implicit provision would not be in tension with the 
legislative scheme, the Court in essence decided the case before 
analyzing the interpretive arguments. 
 
 314 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019). 
 315 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). 
 316 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of ambiguity to operation 
of the avoidance cannon). 
 317 138 S. Ct. at 870 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the relevant term, “detention,” was 
ambiguous). 
 318 See id. at 851 (majority opinion) (explaining that it would not address the constitutional 
challenges because they were not addressed at the Circuit Court level). 
 319 See Nielsen, 139 S. Ct. at 972 (emphasizing that the “arguments here have all been statutory”). 
 320 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (“Despite this constitutional problem, if 
‘Congress has made its intent’ in the statute ‘clear, we must give effect to that intent.’” 
(quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000))). 
 321 Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. at 842. 
 322 Id. at 843. 
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If the Court had (properly) used the avoidance canon in Rodriguez, 
the analysis would have been different.  As in Zadvydas, the Court in 
Rodriguez focused on the identification of “ambiguity,” and thus on 
mandatory vs. permissive language (the “may” vs. “shall” issue),323 when 
it should have addressed the temporal issues regarding the length of 
detention.  Consider that of the provisions discussed by the Court in 
Rodriguez, only one of them, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), which 
was not directly applicable to the case, explicitly required detention 
until the end of removal proceedings.324  Instead, the relevant sections 
either explicitly permit (but do not require) release on bond,325 provide 
that the immigrant shall be detained “for” a further proceeding but do 
not explicitly mandate detention until its conclusion,326 or, most 
restrictively, provide for release from detention only in certain 
circumstances.327  Thus, like with the provision at issue in Zadvydas, the 
provisions implicated in Rodriguez require inferences in order to mean 
that bail is not available for the duration of immigration proceedings, no 
matter the duration of those proceedings.  The necessity of an inference 
in order to make the relevant provisions sufficiently determinate does 
not mean, of course, that the implied language requested by the 
immigrants was necessarily appropriate.  Rather, the reviewing court 
should determine whether an implied provision would undermine the 
legislative scheme, and the majority and dissenting justices disagreed 
on that issue.328  Thus, even if the Court in Rodriguez had framed the 
 
 323 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text (explaining the “may” versus “shall” issue). 
 324 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2012) (“Any alien subject to the procedures under this 
clause shall be detained pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if 
found not to have such a fear, until removed.”). 
 325 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012) (stating “may release the alien”). 
 326 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (stating that an alien shall be detained pending 
review, but not explicitly mandating detention for any specified period of time or until any 
specified event); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012) (prescribing “shall be detained for a 
proceeding”). 
 327 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012) (prescribing “may release an alien . . . only if”). 
 328 In dissent, Justice Breyer came close to the analysis advocated for in this Article.  Justice 
Breyer indicated that “[l]inguistic ambiguity, while necessary, is not sufficient.  I would also 
ask whether the statute’s purposes suggest a congressional refusal to permit bail where 
confinement is prolonged.”  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 872 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  The second part of the inquiry, where the focus is on whether there is a 
“congressional refusal to permit bail where confinement is prolonged” is the proper way to 
frame the inquiry, but if so, the requirement of linguistic ambiguity adds an uncertain element 
to the analysis that the concept of presupposition, and a more granular understanding of the 
ways in which a provision can be indeterminate, do not.  Id.   
May 2021] CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 653 
linguistic issues properly, implied limitations might still have been 
inappropriate. 
3. Presupposition, Underdeterminacy and the Avoidance Canon 
In various cases involving constitutional issues, the Court has failed 
to recognize that the provision at issue is underdetermined relative to 
the requirements of the interpretive dispute.  Part of the problem is 
related to the Court’s focus on “ambiguity,” particularly that of explicit 
terms.  Instead, the Court should adopt a more nuanced (and accurate) 
view of the meaning communicated by language which would recognize 
the existence of implied terms and the reality that the explicit meaning 
of a provision is often not sufficient to resolve all interpretive disputes.  
By reframing the analysis by addressing indeterminacy in light of the 
avoidance canon’s presupposition, rather than searching for 
“ambiguity,” the Court would be able to give decisions like that in 
Zadvydas a much more coherent foundation. 
B.  Creative Lexical Meanings 
The presupposition underlying the avoidance canon is also relevant 
to other common interpretive problems, such as indeterminacy 
regarding the semantic meaning of statutory words and phrases.  When 
an interpretive dispute involves the meaning of one of the explicit but 
undefined words or phrases in a statute, a reviewing court will naturally 
feel constrained by the semantic meaning of the language.329  The 
semantic meaning thus satisfies the clarity requirement of the 
avoidance canon presupposition.  Nevertheless, there will often be 
indeterminacy regarding the semantic meaning of statutory terms, and 
the presupposition may justify the court in choosing an interpretation 
that avoids the constitutional issue.  In fact, lexical meaning is more 
indeterminate than courts typically acknowledge, and terms specific to 
the law are prototypical examples where a court should frequently not 
feel overly constrained by semantic meaning. 
 
 329 See supra notes 131–38 and accompanying text (explaining semantic meaning). 
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1. Hart’s No-Vehicles-In-The-Park Hypothetical and Indeterminate 
Lexical Meanings 
Courts have long struggled to define terms in legal texts with the 
precision necessary to resolve interpretive disputes.  The difficulties 
associated with attempts to define even common words like “vehicle” 
precisely were famously raised by H.L.A. Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park 
hypothetical, which “forbids you to take a vehicle into the public 
park.”330  The hypothetical classically frames the challenges caused by 
the difficulties of categorizing objects and defining words (such as 
vehicle) and the consequent fuzziness (often labeled as vagueness) 
associated with such attempts.331  Hart’s hypothetical reflects an 
underlying belief that the meaning lexicalized by a word (i.e., its 
semantic meaning) is to some degree generalizable across contexts and 
not based on any specific interpretive clues that can be traced to the 
drafter of the text.  Thus, Hart asserts that the rule “plainly . . . forbids an 
automobile.”332  Yet, as Hart also recognizes, the inherent fuzziness of 
words means that there will be uncertainties regarding the domain of 
“vehicle.”333 
If, for example, a court were obliged to construe “vehicle” narrowly 
in order to avoid a serious constitutional question, it would be 
mandatory to include those things that are clearly vehicles, such as 
automobiles, and exclude those things that are clearly not vehicles, 
which would be most objects the world.334  In addition, in order to avoid 
the serious constitutional issue, the court should exclude from the scope 
of the statute things that are not clearly vehicles, such as bicycles, roller 
skates, toy automobiles, and airplanes.335  Such a division requires of 
 
 330 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 
(1958). 
 331 See Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 27–48 
(Eleanor Rosch & Barbara Lloyd eds., 1978) (describing the challenges of categorization); 
Vladimir M. Sloutsky, The Role of Similarity in the Development of Categorization, 7 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCIS. 246, 246 (2003) (describing how categorization works). 
 332 See Hart, supra note 330, at 607. 
 333 Id.  The “domain” refers to the objects to which the word at issue should be applied. 
 334 Trees, flowers, buildings, etc., are clearly not vehicles. 
 335 Some scholars have advocated that questions such as the meaning of “vehicle” are “empirical” 
and can be answered by using the methods of corpus linguistics.  See Thomas R. Lee & 
Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788, 795 (2018) (“Our 
proposed methodology is a set of tools utilized in a field called corpus linguistics.”).  It is 
certainly the case that corpus analysis, and other big data approaches, can reveal how 
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course some methodology for identifying core and peripheral word 
meanings.  Regardless of methodology, though, some scenarios are 
inevitably more straightforward than other scenarios, and should 
therefore more tightly constrain judicial discretion.  For instance, 
tangible artefactual kinds (i.e., “categor[ies] based on a particular 
human relationship to some natural things”) such as “vehicle” typically 
have discernable ordinary meanings that can be determined by 
courts.336  Similarly, with natural kind terms (i.e., categories of things, 
such as “pigeon,” “that occur naturally in the world without need for 
human intervention”), it is quite plausible that technical definitions or 
ordinary meanings that have at least prototypical examples can be 
identified.337  Thus, while there might be some uncertainty regarding the 
extension (i.e., its referential scope) of “vegetable,” as the Supreme 
Court’s famous decision in Nix v. Heddon338 illustrates, certain things are 
definitely vegetables or definitely not vegetables. 
2. Skilling v. United States and Indeterminate Lexical Meanings 
Many statutory words present far more significant definitional 
challenges than the artefactual and natural kinds described above.  
Consider the “intangible right of honest services” phrase at issue in 
Skilling v. United States,339 which some critics have accused the Court of 
narrowing contrary to its accepted meaning.340  As the phrase 
illustrates, often statutes reference intangible concepts that do not exist 
outside of the law.341  In contrast to familiar terms such as “vehicle”342 
and “fruit,”343 the meaning of “intangible right of honest services” phrase 
 
language is used in ways that dictionary definitions cannot.  Corpus analysis cannot 
definitively answer all questions of lexical meaning, however, especially when the term is 
intangible and not used outside of the law. 
 336 See MURPHY & KOSKELA, supra note 135, at 110. 
 337 See id. 
 338 149 U.S. 304 (1893).  In Nix, the Court determined, through its own understanding of 
language and the world, that a “tomato” was a “vegetable” rather than a “fruit.” Id. at 306. 
 339 561 U.S. 358 (2010).  The constitutional issue arose because Skilling argued that the honest-
services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, is unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 399. 
 340 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Passive Avoidance, 71 STAN. L. REV. 513, 533–34 (2019) 
(referring to the Court’s “strained” interpretation). 
 341 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) provides a penalty to anyone who devises “any scheme or artifice to 
defraud,” which under 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) includes “a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.” 
 342 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25–27 (1931) (determining that an “airplane ” is 
not a “vehicle”). 
 343 Nix, 149 U.S. at 306–07 (determining that “tomatoes” are “vegetables” and not “fruit”). 
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cannot be determined by reference to non-legal sources, and thus does 
not have an “ordinary” meaning.  Rather, it is a judicially created term 
and as such has developed in a common law, piecemeal fashion.344 
A few aspects of a term like “intangible right of honest services” 
create genuine space for judicial interpretive creativity because the 
semantic constraints are narrow.  The combination of intangibility and 
judicial or statutory creation is an indication that it will often be unclear 
which features are aspects of a word’s lexical meaning, resulting in 
multiple possible meanings (referred to as multi-dimensional 
polysemy).345  For example, even a common word like “intelligent” (like 
“reasonable”) is potentially indeterminate, based on multi-dimensional 
polysemy, because it may be unclear which features are intrinsic to the 
concept itself.346  The term may be applied based on some combination 
of one’s capacity “for memory, abstract thought, self-awareness, 
communication, learning, emotional knowledge, creativity, and problem 
solving,” or on the basis of other features.347  Furthermore, even though 
the phrase “intangible right of honest services” consists entirely of 
common words found outside the law, combinations of words 
frequently present interpretive difficulties.  Conceptual combination is 
often illustrated using the “pet fish” example.348  Something is a “pet fish” 
if it is both a “pet” and a “fish.”349  One might think that something is a 
stereotypical pet fish if it is a stereotypical pet and a stereotypical fish.350  
The problem, though, is that a good example of a pet fish (perhaps, a 
guppy) is neither a prototypical pet (some breed of dog) nor a 
prototypical fish (perhaps, a trout).351  The example illustrates that two 
concepts, “pet” and “fish,” often cannot be combined in a 
straightforward way to create a complex concept.352  This definitional 
 
 344 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 404 (indicating that the Court would “pare that body of precedent 
[interpreting “intangible right of honest services”] down to its core” in order to preserve the 
statute). 
 345 See LANIUS, supra note 275, at 33. 
 346 See id. 
 347 Id. 
 348 See Andrew C. Connolly, Jerry A. Fodor, Lila R. Gleitman, & Henry Gleitman, Why Stereotypes 
Don’t Even Make Good Defaults, 103 COGNITION 1, 5 (2007). 
 349 Id. 
 350 See id. 
 351 See id. (“[T]here is a prima facie problem about how to reconcile the stereotype theory of 
concepts with the compositionality constraint.”). 
 352 See id. 
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issue is especially acute for intangible concepts that do not exist outside 
of the law.353 
As the Court explained in Skilling, it is unclear which features are 
intrinsic to the concept of “intangible concept of honest services.”354  
Seeking to “construe[] rather than invalidate[],” the Court examined 
case law and “pare[d] that body of precedent down to its core.”355  
Although previous courts had at times applied the term more broadly, 
and the decisions were “not models of clarity or consistency,”356 the 
Court limited the term to its “solid core,”357 which involves “fraudulent 
schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or 
kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been deceived.”358  In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia argued that case law had created 
significant uncertainties regarding the meaning of “intangible concept 
of honest services,” courts had used the term much more broadly than 
the Court had indicated, and the Court’s definition was much narrower 
than what Congress had intended.359  The legitimacy of the Court’s 
opinion, though, does not turn on whether there is substantial 
uncertainty regarding the meaning of the term or whether it had at 
times been used more broadly than the Court’s definition.  Similar to 
“vehicle,” where a court would be justified in excluding things as 
vehicles when they are not clearly vehicles, the Court was justified in 
excluding activities as falling within the “intangible concept of honest 
services” category when the activities did not clearly fall within the 
category.360  Rather, Justice Scalia’s argument would be persuasive only 
if there was no stable semantic meaning that could form the basis of the 
term, or if it was clear that the semantic meaning of the term must 
exceed the Court’s definition. 
 
 353 See id. 
 354 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 404 (2010). 
 355 Id. 
 356 Id. at 405. 
 357 Id. at 407. 
 358 Id. at 404. 
 359 See id. at 417–22 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia also argued that even under the Court’s 
definition the phrase is impermissibly vague.  Id. at 421. 
 360 See supra notes 330–36 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulties in properly 
defining terms that create categories). 
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3. Assessing Presuppositions and Lexical Indeterminacy 
As the Skilling case illustrates, the presupposition model of the 
avoidance canon can take account of disputes regarding lexical meaning.  
Because the presupposition is based on an assumption of clarity, word 
meanings can be narrowed to exclude marginal meanings and 
applications, subject to the restraint that doing so must not undermine 
the legislative scheme.  Furthermore, an understanding of the significant 
indeterminacy present in word meanings, especially with intangible, 
multi-word terms that are specific to the law, underscores the 
legitimacy of courts defining terms (usually narrowly) in order to avoid 
serious constitutional issues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The avoidance canon has played a crucial role in many important 
Supreme Court cases, and undoubtedly will do so in the future, yet 
scholars have persistently criticized the legitimacy of the canon’s 
influence on the Court’s statutory interpretations.361  The Court’s 
understatement of the avoidance canon’s influence only serves to 
underscore the undertheorized nature of the canon’s structural and 
triggering elements,362 as does the Court’s misguided efforts to 
distinguish between the avoidance canon and clear statement rules.363  
The central flaw in the avoidance canon is clear.  The Court’s concept of 
ambiguity does not offer a neutral triggering mechanism for the canon 
because it depends on ideology rather than linguistic tests or useful 
definitions.364  Solving the avoidance canon’s deficiencies requires a 
more nuanced approach to language, including a broader notion of 
statutory meaning that focuses on the communicative meaning of a text 
rather than merely its literal meaning as well as recognition of the 
multiple ways in which a provision might be indeterminate.365  In turn, 
this understanding of language offers a basis for reconceptualizing the 
 
 361 See supra note 2 (arguing that the Court has used the avoidance canon to “rewrite laws”). 
 362 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s view of the role of the 
avoidance canon). 
 363 See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s distinction between 
the avoidance canon and clear statement rules). 
 364 See supra Part III. (describing the connections between presupposition and statutory 
interpretation). 
 365 See supra Part IV.A. (describing communicative meaning). 
May 2021] CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 659 
avoidance canon’s triggering element and the theory of how it fits into 
the structure of statutory interpretation. 
The discussion of triggering and structural elements might seem 
abstract and theoretical, but changing these elements of the avoidance 
canon would be more than an academic exercise.  Rather, doing so 
would change the manner in which the Court approaches statutory 
interpretation in avoidance canon cases and, consequently, the results 
in some of those cases.  Consider the Court’s problematic focus on literal 
meaning and rejection of implied meanings.366  One consequence of this 
focus, exemplified by Zadvydas and other immigration detention cases, 
is a failure to recognize the inferences that are necessary to make the 
textual language sufficiently determinate to decide interpretive 
disputes.  Changing the avoidance canon’s trigger would reorient the 
interpretive focus from the ambiguity of some explicit term to a broader 
search for indeterminacy that would sanction judicial recognition of 
implicit language that is consistent with a statute’s legislative design.367  
By reconsidering the avoidance canon’s structural and triggering 
elements in this way, the Court can give the avoidance canon a more 
coherent foundation that would better legitimize the Court’s decisions.  
Furthermore, examination of triggering and structural elements should 
not be limited to the avoidance canon.  Other interpretive principles 




 366 See supra Part IV.B. (describing how implied understandings are a natural part of both legal 
and non-legal interpretation). 
 367 See supra notes 266–277 and accompanying text (exploring the complexities of triggering 
the avoidance canon in legal interpretation). 
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